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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
Civil Action
Docket No. CV 84-133

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
V .

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND C O .,
i
¡t

Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANT SEARS, ROEBUCK
AND
CO.
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This pretrial memorandum is submitted by Defendant Sears,
Roebuck and Co.

("Sears") pursuant to Rule 16 of the Maine

Rules of Civil Procedure.
li

i
i
■¡
,

A.

Pretrial Conference.
Sears requests a pretrial conference at the earliest

i
1
i
■
¡
:

possible date and, if possible,

during the first week of April

pursuant to the tentative schedule established by the Court.
B.

Time Required.
Sears estimates that two hours will be required for the

i
i

pretrial conference.
C.

Trial D a t e .
The Court has set the date of May 13, 1985 for commencement

of trial.
D.

Time Required for Trial.
Based upon the number of witnesses and exhibits listed by

!i
I

the State of Maine ("State") in its pretrial memorandum.

Sears

believes the State's estimate of eight or nine days for
presentation of its case to be a substantial underestimate.
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Although Sears cannot accurately estimate the time it will take

to present its own case until it knows what witnesses will
actually be called by the State and what evidence the State
will actually offer,

Sears preliminarily estimates that twelve

1
to fifteen trial days will be required for its case.

Assuming

all claims raised by the State are to be tried, Sears estimates
that the trial of this action will require a minimum of one
month and, possibly,
E.

two months or more.

Jury Demand.
Jury trial is not available in this case.

F.
I
Ij

Fending Motions.
There are no motions pending at this time.

Pursuant to a

briefing schedule Sears intends to request at the pretrial
conference. Sears intends to file a number of pretrial motions,
including, without limitation,

a motion to preclude the State

from calling the Maine retailers listed on page 11 of its list
I
i
[

of witnesses,

as well as Arthur Lemothe,

Office of Attorney General.

an employee of the

Neither the retailers nor Mr.

Lemothe have been previously identified by the State as
potential witnesses,

despite a long-standing interrogatory

request for it to do so and a corporate deposition of the State
in which it failed to identify any of those witnesses.
believes that if those witnesses were to be called,

Sears

substantial

additional discovery would be required and new issues
introduced into the case.

The untimely identification of those

witnesses several months after the court-imposed discovery
FIERCE. ATWOOD.
SCRIBNER. ALLEN.
S M ITHS LANCASTER

deadline of November 5, 1984, furthermore, would result in

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ.
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irreparable prejudice to Sears’ defense in this case if the
witnesses were allowed to testify at trial.
The State has continued to fail to provide knowledgeable
witnesses responsive to Sears' notice of the State's deposition
and has refused to answer any questions in a number of areas
identified in the deposition notice.

The State's refusal has

been the subject of a previous motion to compel discovery and
for sanctions by Sears.

Sears intends to file additional

motions to compel discovery and for sanctions,
Finally,

if appropriate.

Sears requests that the parties be required to

identify at the pretrial conference any legal issues, excluding
evidentiary issues, to be raised by motions and briefed prior
to trial.
G.

Statement of the Nature of the C a s e .
Sears is a national retailer of a variety of products with

eight retail stores in the State of Maine in which several
million consumer transactions occur each year.
promotes sales of its products,

Sears regularly

and hundreds of products are

usually advertised for sale at any given time.

Sears'

promotions are primarily done on a national or regional basis,
with the planning for both advertising and ordering of sale
merchandise extending over a period of several months.
planning promotions,

In

Sears utilizes, sophisticated methods of

determining the expected demand for the advertised products and
ordering sufficient quantities of product to meet that
anticipated demand.

Since 1977, pursuant to an existing

ii
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Consent Order issued by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
Sears has had in place a comprehensive corporate policy (the
M-13 Policy) against so-called "bait and switch" tactics which
is effectively communicated to its employees through regular
training.
-1

This policy covers selling practices and procedures

relating to availability of advertised merchandise,
how to handle unexpected,

including

temporarily out of stock conditions

relating to advertised merchandise.
Sears also sells maintenance agreements on certain of its
products which, with certain delineated exceptions,
Sears,

obligate

among other things, to keep the products in "proper

operating condition" during the period of the contract.
jl

■i
‘
i

The

maintenance agreements also provide a number of benefits not
provided under any warranty,

including repair of product

failures not resulting from defects existing at the time of
sale and not caused by abuse or act of God, annual preventive
¡1

maintenance, product adjustments,

consumer instruction in the

!l
use of the product,

fixed and known costs to the customer for

product maintenance and repair,

correction of problems caused

by customer installation or hook-up,

food loss coverage for

refrigerators and freezers and other benefits.

Furthermore,

the prices of Sears' maintenance agreements are based on the
i.

costs of servicing the products involved,
any applicable express warranty.

after expiration of

No part of the maintenance

j
•i
j
PIERCE. ATWOOD. !
r.CRIENER. ALIEN. !
'MITH & LANCASTER !
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P O R TL A N D , M AINE

agreement price is assessed for coverage during the express
warranty period of the product.

provide valuable benefits to its customers, beyond express or
implied warranty coverage.

04101
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Sears' maintenance agreements

Sears' express warranties, moreover, disclose in accordance
with federal law, the existence of additional rights,
implied warranties, which vary from state to state.

including
Sears'

express warranties do not disclaim implied warranties.

Sears'

promotional literature on maintenance agreements, distributed
through its stores (examples of which were attached to the
Amended Complaint), disclose the difference in coverage between
Sears' express warranties and maintenance agreements.
Furthermore,

Sears has a longstanding customer satisfaction

policy expressed in store signing,

Sears' catalogs,

retail

advertising and other communications to customers as
"Satisfaction Guaranteed or Your Money Back".
Despite such uncontrovertible facts, the State claims that
Sears has violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5
M.R.S.A.

§206-209, by:

(1) allegedly engaging in bait and

switch tactics and by advertising products that are
"unavailable" for sale,

(2) allegedly selling maintenance

agreements that almost entirely duplicate the express and
implied warranties,

and (3) allegedly attempting to disclaim

the Maine implied warranty of merchantability and
misrepresenting the value of maintenance agreements to
customers.

The evidence on which the State appears to rely to

support such claims is clearly insufficient to establish any of
them.

Furthermore,

in a number of respects, the claims are

based upon novel, unprecedented and untenable theories of law.

i
r

;i

H.
!

i
;I

Legal Issues and Theories.
Despite months of discovery,

involving over a hundred

witnesses and hundreds of thousands of documents, the State's

ii
1

1

I
'!
!'

exposition in its pretrial memorandum of its theories and
related legal issues remains unfocused,
not amenable to a detailed response.
mind, Sears believes, however,

extremely general and

With such limitations in

that the following issues must

be considered by the Court:

*i

(1)

Bait and Switch and Unavailability Claims.

(a)

The principal issues relating to the State's bait and

switch claims are whether the State can establish by adequate
ij

proof:
(i) that any alleged acts of bait and switch actually

i (

i:
(

occurred in Maine;
(ii) that the advertisements involved in such acts
ii

f!

'1

were not, in fact, intended by Sears as bona fide offers to
sell the advertised goods;

and

{i
(iii) that, if any individual acts of bait and switch
were established to have occurred in Maine, taken in light
j
i

¡
1
►

of Sears' policy against bait and switch, they are
representative and establish a pattern of conduct or
practice of Sears.

ii

¡1
ii

(b)

The State fails to identify in its pretrial memorandum

precisely what it means by the term "unavailable" and fails to
iI
•i

identify the alleged "institutionalized retail practices that

it
'I

FIERCE. ATWOOD, jl
SCRIBNER. ALLEN. I
CMITH & LANCASTER j

are tantamount to bait and switch advertising".

However,

view that the temporary unavailability of a sale item m

O N E M O N U M E N T SO. ||
PORTLAND. M AIN E j
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given store during a promotional period in which hundreds of

;|

items may be on sale, without more, constitutes a violation of
the Unfair Trade Practices Act,

is unprecedented and

inconsistent with interpretations of Section 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,

15 U.S.C.

§45(a)(l),

and rules of

the Federal Trade Commission which, pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.
§207(1), must guide this Court.
(c)

As part of its unavailability claims, the State

apparently contends that the use of the statement,

"Each.of

these advertised items is readily available for sale as
advertised", in connection with the advertisement of certain
major appliances warehoused in regional distribution centers,
is an unfair trade practice.

But the use of that language in

advertisements is mandated by the Federal Trade Commission in
its Order in In The Matter of Sears, Roebuck and C o ., Docket
No. 9883 (1977).
i
i

The FTC Order also recognized the use of

warehouse facilities not located at the store as a means of
making major appliances so advertised "available for sale".

To

the extent that the State's bait and switch claims relate to
major home appliances,

Sears' actions,

as to those claims,

are

governed by the FTC Order and, therefore:
1
i

(i)

the Unfair Trade Practices Act is inapplicable to

such claims pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.

§208 which provides that

the Act does not apply to actions permitted under laws as
:

FIERCE. ATWOOD. ■
SCRIBNER, ALLEN, !
SMITH & LANCASTER ;

administered by regulatory boards acting under statutory
authority of the United States;

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ
PO R TLAN D . M AINE
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(ii)
5 M.R.S.A.

the Court must be guided by the FTC Order under
§207(1),

and, insofar as Sears' practices are in

conformity with the Order, the Court must find Sears has
not violated the law; and
(iii)

not only is the State attempting to establish

judicially made rules inconsistent with the FTC Order in
this case, it is attempting to do so without engaging in
appropriate rulemaking procedures pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.
§207(2), which provides that rules and regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General under the Act must be
consistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the
Federal Trade Commission.

Section 207(2) would preclude

the issuance of any rules inconsistent with the FTC Order,
(d)

For the State to accomplish by litigation what it has

failed to undertake by rulemaking would also violate Sears'
right to Due Process under the Maine and United States
I*
Constitutions.
i!

II

ii

(2)

Claims Pertaining to Maintenance Agreements.
------------------------------------

The State's still nascent legal theories relating to
maintenance agreements sold by Sears appear to be based on one
of the following three concepts:

(a) that maintenance

I

agreements somehow duplicate coverage provided under express
||

and implied warranties,

(b) that Sears attempts to disclaim the

implied warranty of merchantability,

and (c) that Sears',

in

some unspecified way, misrepresents or fails to disclose the
M
PIERCE. ATWOOD. '
7CKIBNER. ALLEN, j
:-MITH & LANCASTER j

need for and value of maintenance agreements.
^

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ. j
PORTLAND. M AINE |
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(a )

The State's "Duplication" Theories.
(i)

The State's theories of duplication appear to be

based upon an assertion that Maine's implied warranty of
merchantability means "that the product should function in
accordance with the reasonable expectations of a consumer
for a reasonable period of time for the goods of the type
purchased."

(See Amended Complaint at page 18.)

This

novel and unprecedented contention is both inconsistent
V
I

with the Maine Uniform Commercial Code, 11 M.R.S.A.

'

and unsupported by case law in Maine or any other

§2-314,

jurisdiction.
(ii)

If the implied warranty of merchantability were

assumed to have a specific duration for every one of the
broad range of products sold by Sears, which Sears
disputes,

it could not extend beyond a period of four years

after sale in light of the four year statute of limitations
under 11 M.R.S.A.
(iii)

§2-725(1).

The definition of the implied warranty of

merchantability advanced by the State is unsupported by and
inconsistent with decisions and interpretations of the
courts and the Federal Trade Commission under Section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§45(a)(l), and is thus barred by the "guided by" provisions
of 5 M.R.S.A.
(iv)
1
PIERCE, ATWOOD, I
SCRIBNER, ALLEN, I
SMITH S LANCASTER j

§207(1).

The requsted written statements describing the

implied warranty sought by the State constitute a "written

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ.
P O R TLA N D . M AINE
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i

warranty" as defined by federal law and are preempted and

■:

precluded by provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act,
ij

§2311(c)(l).

15 U.S.C.

The Act provides that a state requirement

1
concerning written warranty disclosure which is not
|j
"

identical to the requirements of the Magnuson-Moss Act or
rules promulgated thereunder shall not be applicable to
written warranties in compliance with the Act.

Sears

complies with the Magnuson-Moss rules for disclosure of
written warranties.

In the absence of application by the

State to the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§2311 for exemption from federal preemption, the State is
precluded by federal law from requiring the written
disclosure it seeks.
(v)

The relief sought by the State is further

preempted and precluded by the provisions of Section 106 of
the Magnuson-Moss Act,
i

15 USC §2306, which provides that

nothing contained therein shall be construed to prevent any
supplier or warrantor from entering into a service contract
in addition to a written warranty if the contract discloses
its terms in simple and readily understood language.
Sears' written maintenance agreements describe their terms

;i
!|
:t

and conditions in simple and readily understood language.
(vi)

The content of the "disclosure" sought by the

state is also inconsistent with the implied warranty
disclosure requirements which the State itself has
PIERCE, ATWOOD, a
ICRIBNER. ALLEN. ;
MITH 8 LANCASTER I

promulgated pursuant to rulemaking under 5 M.R.S.A.

; n e M O N U M E N T SO. [j
PO R TLAN D . M AINE
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§207(2)

(for the automobile industry.

The State's attempt to

judicially establish such conflicting disclosure
requirements constitutes an unauthorized and improper
rulemaking process inconsistent with 5 M.R.S.A.
violation of Sears'

§207(2) in

right to Due Process under the Maine

land United States Constitutions.
(vii)

This action constitutes selective enforcement

against Sears of standards not applied to other retailers
similarly situated and denies Sears equal protection of law
contrary to Article I, 6-A of the Constitution of the State
of Maine and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.
(b)

The State's Disclaimer Theo r y .

The evidence at trial will demonstrate that Sears does not
attempt to disclaim the Maine implied warranty of
merchantability.

Its written warranties, which comply with the

federal Magnuson-Moss warranty disclosure requirements,

state

"This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may
also have other rights which vary from state to state".
(i)

Under State ex rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor

Company, 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981),

in order for an attempted

disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability to
constitute an unfair trade practice, the attempt must take
place at or before the time the sale is consummated.

Thus,

the State's disclaimer allegations can relate only to sales
PIERCE, ATWOOD. I
SCRIBNER. ALLEN. '
SMITH & LANCASTER |

of maintenance agreements occurring at the time the product
to which the maintenance agreement applies is sold.

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ
PO RTLAND . M AINE
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(ii)

To the extent that the State's disclaimer theory

assumes that an affirmative disclosure concerning the
implied warranty of merchantability must be made at the
point of sale, there is simply no applicable law containing
such a requirement.
I

(iii)

In cases where disclaimers or limitations of

implied warranty are permitted by law, both the Maine
■i

Uniform Commercial Code,

11 M.R.S.A.

§2-316, and the

Magnuson-Moss Act set forth specific requirements which
must be met for disclaimers or limitations to be
effective.

The State has no evidence that Sears has ever

attempted to make such disclaimers.
(c)

The State's Misrepresentations Theories.
!

Sears leaves the State to its proof of the allegations that
i
¡1
■i

Sears misrepresents in any way the actual need for and value of
maintenance agreements.

However, the State has not yet
5

identified what specific representations it relies on or the
circumstances under which they were allegedly made.
Furthermore, neither federal nor state law contains any
specific requirements for the form of the disclosure of
information concerning service contracts.

Although authorized

to promulgate such requirements under 15 U.S.C.

§2306, the

Federal Trade Commission has, by conscious decision, not
!j

undertaken to do so.
(3)

]i
PIERCE. ATWOOD, j
"CRIBNER. ALLEN, i
LMITH & LANCASTER i

Consumer Solicitation Sales A c t .

Sears believes that the State's claims concerning the

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ. I
PORTLAND. M AINE i
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'!

Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. 4662, raise the
following issues:

'i

(a) whether the Act applies to retailers selling products
from a fixed place of business in the State of Maine;
(b) whether the Act applies to the sale of maintenance
agreements purchased by Sears customers who have initially
rj

contacted Sears to purchase the product covered by the

;!

maintenance agreement;
(c) whether the Act applies to maintenance agreements sold
in Sears stores;
(d) whether the Act applies to renewals of maintenance
agreements already in effect;
(e) the nature of any requirement of signature by the
customer under the Act; and
(f) if the Act is applicable, whether the provision of more
favorable cancellation rights to the consumer is sufficient to
1negate ~any~ putative technical- violation of the Act.
(4)

Injunctive Relief.

The State has demanded varying forms of injunctive relief
i
!

in its Amended Complaint.

Sears submits that the general

equitable principles applicable to the granting or denial of
injunctive relief apply in this case.

If any violation of the

Unfair Trade Practices Act was found,

the application of those

principles would be at issue and would bar,

as a matter of law,

the injunctive relief the State seeks in this case.
PIERCE. Ar.VOOD. II
SCRIBNER. ALLEN. I
SMITH & LANCASTER
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I.

Unusual Legal Issues.

Sears has never suggested,
memorandum implies,
"secrecy".

as the State's pretrial

that the trial of this case be conducted in

Sears has provided to the State in the course of

discovery numerous documents which contain commercially
sensitive, proprietary and otherwise confidential information,
privileged from disclosure to others.

Sears is willing to

discuss with the State the designation as confidential of any
document which the State intends introduce as evidence.

Sears

also requests that the manner in which confidential documents
may be used at trial, and protective measures with respect
thereto, be discussed at the pretrial conference pursuant to
Rule 507 of the Maine Rules of Evidence.
As indicated in section H of this pretrial memorandum,
Sears believes that several of the State's legal theories are
novel and unusual.
J.

Status of Discover y .
Discovery is complete with the following exceptions:
(a)

As noted elsewhere in this pretrial memorandum,

Sears

opposes the addition by the State of five appliance retailers
and Arthur Lemothe as witnesses.
I

testimony at trial.
witnesses to testify,

If the Court were to permit those
Sears would want to take the depositions

of all of them prior to trial,
ij

The Court should bar their

including obtaining documents

concerning the business of the five appliance retailers which

ii

I

PIERCE. ATWOOD, j
SCRIBNER. ALLEN, ]

might relate to their anticipated testimony.

'MITH & LANCASTER I
O N E M O N U M E N T SQ.
PO R TLA N D . MAINE

04101
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(b)

Sears and the State have agreed that the depositions

of several consumers, who were previously scheduled for
deposition but failed to appear, may be taken.

It is

anticipated that the depositions will be completed within two
weeks.
(c)

As noted elsewhere herein, the State has failed to

fully respond to Sears' notice of the State's deposition.
Sears suggests further discussion of that matter at the
pretrial conference.
(d)

With the exception of a portion of its Brunswick

store, Sears has provided the State with the names of former
employees at all stores who sold major appliances or
maintenance agreements in response to Interrogatory No. 7.

It

will provide the additional names for Brunswick as soon as
possible.
(e)

Sears has fully responded to the State's Rule 34

requests for production of documents, except for documents
containing proprietary information of Toshiba America,

Inc.

Sears believes that it has reached a satisfactory solution with
1
I

the State concerning production of relevant portions of the
Toshiba documents.
(f)

On March 20, Sears received a letter from the State

making an informal request for additional documents and is in
the process of responding to it.
K.
PIERCE. ATWOOD,
SCRIBNER, ALLEN,
SMITH & LANCASTER I

Proposed Stipulations and Admissions.
Sears reserves the right to propose stipulations or admis

sions.

It believes that Sears and the State will be able to

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ.
PORTLAND. M AINE
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stipulate to the authenticity of most documents to be offered
as evidence and to the admissibility of many documents.
I

Sears responds to the proposed stipulations contained in

i

the State's pretrial memorandum as follows:
(1)
■I
<!

Sears does not stipulate that all trial exhibits

proposed by the State are authentic and admissible at trial,
subject to relevancy objections.

Sears believes it will be

able to stipulate to the authenticity of almost all of the
exhibits and will be able to stipulate to the admissibility of
many of them.

It anticipates that there will be objections to
i

the admissibility of many of the documents.
(2)

Sears at this time does not stipulate that the draft

report listed as Exhibit 36 in Attachment A to the State's

j
}

pretrial memorandum is a later version of Dort Deposition
Exhibit 2.
(3)

Sears does not stipulate that the depositions of Sears

employees, including Maine employees,

are admissible as direct

testimony of the State without restricting the State's right to
call such witnesses for limited direct testimony.

In addition

to the fact that many of the Sears employees who have been
deposed will appear as witnesses at trial, most of the
deposition transcripts themselves are not admissible under the
standards of Rule 32(a)(2) and (3) of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure.
■

(

L.
PIERCE. ATWOOD, f
3CRIBNER, ALLEN,
..MITH & LANCASTER

Documents to be Produced.
Sears notes that the State has requested it to produce

originals of thousands of pages of documents listed in

O N E M O N U M E N T SQ
PO R TLAN D . MAINE
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i

Attachment A to the State's pretrial memorandum.
suggests that copies of most documents,

Sears

in lieu of originals,

ought to be used at trial and that the matter be discussed at
the pretrial conference.
M.

List of Exhibits.
Sears objects to the State's reservation of the opportunity

to add additional trial exhibits.
Attachment~A~'i's~£~~iist of exhibits, not including documents
used for rebuttal, which Sears may offer in its direct case at
trial.

Due to the State's lack of precision in identifying its

legal theories and issues, the uncertainty as to what witnesses
the State will actually call at trial and what portions of what
depositions it intends to offer, and its indication that it has
f
"not yet given final analysis of all the exhibits it intends to
introduce at trial",

Sears reserves the right to add additional

exhibits on reasonable notice to the State.

Sears also

reserves the right to offer at trial any exhibit listed by the
State.

Sears requests that in the pretrial order the Court

order the parties to meet on or before April 15, 1985 to
identify proposed trial exhibits in accordance with Exhibit C
hereto and to file such a proposed exhibit list with the Court
as to all proposed trial exhibits on or before May 1, 1985.
N.

List of Witnesses.
Attachment B is a list of witnesses, not including rebuttal

witnesses, whom Sears may call at trial.
PIERCE. ATWOOD, t
SCRIBNER. ALLEN.
SMITH & LANCASTER

Sears does not

represent that it will call or produce all witnesses listed.

O N E M O N U M E N T SO.
•PORTLAND. M A I N E
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I
I

and, for the reasons stated in paragraph M of this pretrial
memorandum,

Sears reserves the right to add additional

witnesses on reasonable notice to the State.

Sears also

anticipates it may call a number of employees in rebuttal to
consumer testimony offered by the State.
The State was provided with the names of all former Sears
employees requested by the State for all stores other than
South Portland and a portion of the Brunswick store some time
ago.

The State has now been provided with a list of names of

former employees for the South Portland store and will receive
a final list of Brunswick employees soon.

Although Sears

previously has identified scores of former employees for the
State,

the State has failed to identify any former Sears

employees whom it intends to call at trial.

Sears,

therefore,

objects to any former Sears employees being called by the State
at trial, other than former employees of the South Portland and
Brunswick store whom the State identifies and Sears has a
reasonable opportunity to depose,
pretrial conference.

on or before the date of the

Sears requests that in its pretrial order

the Court require the parties to meet on or before April 15,
1985 to discuss what deposition transcripts,

including those of

consumer witnesses, will be offered as evidence at trial in
lieu of live testimony and with respect to such transcripts, to
file with the Court, on or before May 1, 1985, the transcripts
■ !i
¡I

in a form to which the parties have agreed with separate
identification of any disputed portions of each transcript.

PIERCE. ATWOOD. j|
TCRIBNER. ALLEN. !■
..MITH & LANCASTER ||
O N E M O N U M E N T SO. |j
P O R T L A N D . M A I N E l]
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O.

Reports of Physicians.
Not applicable.

P.

Damages.
Sears notes that the State proposes that a separate

proceeding be held on the issue of restitution pursuant to the
Third and Fourth Causes of Action of the Amended Complaint.
All issues,

including any issues relating to restitution, can

and must be dealt with in one proceeding.
remedy contemplated by 5 M.R.S.A.

The restitutional

§209 requires proof of a

specific ascertainable loss for each individual as to whom
restitution is sought.

j

This action was not brought as a class
I

action, and, although the State has identified a total of 79
I

specific consumers it intends to offer as witnesses at trial,
%

it has not identified those as to whom it seeks restitution
||

under Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint.

The State is

¡!
i

required to identify at trial as an element of its liability

¡i

claim, with respect to any such individual for whom it claims
restitution, the particularized loss it claims for that
person.

Any separate proceeding on the issue of restitution

would violate the Unfair Trade Practices Act and would involve
duplication of testimony, unnecessary expenditure of additional
court time and unwarranted additional expense to Sears.
Q.

View.
No view is requested.

R.

Special Verdict.

‘TJ

Not applicable.

IERCE. ATWOOD.
oCRIBNER, ALLEN.
LM ITH S LANCASTER
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S.

Settlement.
The parties have discussed settlement.

Sears has made,

in
!

its view,

a reasonable counterproposal to a State proposal for

settlement of this action.

The State has indicated that Sears'

!
!

A

counterproposal is unacceptable to it, but has not otherwise

■t
•i

responded.
T.

The case is firm for trial.
i

Learned Treatises.

i

-------------------------------------------------

I

Sears has identified no learned treatises which it intends
to offer as evidence at this time, but reserves the right to do

j
I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.

March 27, 1985

l|

I,
Jeffrey M. White, Attorney for Defendant Sears, Roebuck
and Co., hereby certify that I made service of the above
Pretrial Memorandum upon the Plaintiff by causing a conformed
copy of the same to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, on March 27, 1985, addressed to counsel of record:
Rufus E. Brown, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333

FIERCE. ATWOOD. I
SCRIBNER. ALLEN. I
SMITH & LANCASTER |
O N E M O N U M E N T SO.
PO R TLA N D . M AINE

04101
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ATTACHMENT A
1.

Manual of Compliance Procedures under "Bait and Switch" Consent
Order, Bulletin M-13, dated June 10,1977--10,009-10,044

2.

Management Responsibilities for Compliance with FTC "Bait and
Switch" Consent Order, M-13 Rev., June 10, 1977--10,045-10,052

3.

Sears "Raincheck" Procedures for Small Ticket Merchandise,
Bulletin M-13 Rev., Supp. #1--10,053-10,059

4.

Service to Customers--Maintenance Agreements, Bulletin
S-731--10,060-10,087

5.

"Preventive Maintenance Checks and Why"--10,111-10,134

6.

Customer Complaint and Adjustment Handling, Bulletin 0-277
Rev.--10,144-10,153

7.

Consumer Product Warranties, Bulletin S-l Rev.--10,154-10,169

8.

Effective Date of Warranties, Bulletin S-l, Supp. #1
--10,170-10,175

9.

Pages 6-3 - 6-6 of Sears Group Internal Auditors Manual,
Janu-ary 1, 1984

10. Decision and Order in In the Matter of Sears, Roebuck and C o .,
FTC Docket No. 8993 (1977)"'
11. Pamphlet entitled "Maintenance Agreements Sales Floor", January,
1984--10,233-10,234
12. Pamphlet with "Satisfaction Guaranteed or Your Money Back"
Policy--10,236
13. Maintenance agreement'pamphlets on tape deck, typewriter, snow
throwers, lawn care/tillers, VCR/video disc/video cameras,
stereo equipment, color/black and white television, electronic
video games, refrigerator/freezer, room air
conditioners/dehumidifiers, heat pumps/heat-cool units, water
heaters, water softener/water treatment filters, furnace mount
humidifier, boiler and furnace, space heaters, portable
humidifier air cleaner/humidifier, Kenmore washer/dryer,
dishwasher, ranges/microwave ovens, radial arm saw and table
saw, garage door openers, typewriter, portable electric air
compressor, floor care products, built in vacuum systems,
Kenmore sewing machines, Kenmore compacters and Kenmore range;
Gribb Exhibit No. 36--10,268-10,296
14. Adjustment Policy When Repair Parts or Repairs are Unavailable
or there is an Excess Delay in Obtaining Parts, dated April 24,
1981; Gribb Exhibit No. 71--11,613-11,616

15. Maintenance Agreement Price Li st--11,895-11,899
15. Service to Customers and Parts Statement, January,
1984, Sandidge Exhibit No. 1--11,900-11,909
17. Par Pricing Manual, Rev.
7--11,914-12,043

1-84,

1984 to May,

Sandidge Exhibit No.

18. Warranty Information for Customer Inspection dated April,
Sandidge Exhibit No. 7--12,046

1984,

19. Maintenance Agreement Price List,
54--12,140-12,141

Shewan Exhibit No.

20. Maintenance Agreement Price List,

Shewan Exhibit No. 63--12,157

21. Mechanical Service Analysis Report 93, dated February,
January, 1984--12,205-12,411

1983 to

22. 1985 Maintenance Agreement Rational--12,412-12,439
23.

Service to Customers--Maintenance Agreements,
Rev.--12,513-12,555

S-731, Section IX

24. Memo from W. J. Suva dated January, 1981 and enclosed Mechanical
Service Analysis Manual--12,800-12,890
25. Service to Customers and Parts Statements, Reports No. 5 and
5A--13,539-13,555
26. Maintenance Agreements Sales Floor Price List,

1/1/83

27. Maintenance Agreements Sales Floor Price List,- 11/82
Rev.--14,214-14,215
28. Maintenance Agreements Sales Floor Price List,
Rev.--14,329-14,330

11/81

29. Retail Store Merchandise Condition Reports--13,667-13,679
30. Maintenance Agreement Survey 9-83--15,432-15,501
31. Mechanical Service Analysis,

Par Pricing Manual--14,557-14,745

32. Maintenance Agreements, Basic Training,

9/81--14,916-14,925

33. 1985 Maintenance Agreement Rational--15,568-15,623
34. Card stating goals of customer satisfaction--17,406
35. Life Cycle Performance of Small Appliances, Dort Deposition
Exhibit 2
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36. Rolling Total Mechanical Service Analysis Report 88 - In
Warranty Service, Peters Deposition Exhibit 53
37. Par Pricing Manual Rev. 1-85, Peters Deposition Exhibit 54
38. Maintenance Agreement Sales Floor Price List, January,
1985--19,015-19,106
39. Owners Manuals for major appliances and other products on which
Maintenance Agreements are sold
40. Sample Maintenance Agreement
41. Warranty Display Instructions
42. Kenmore Consumer Checklists for Regrigerators, Freezers, Ranges,
Microwaves, Ovens, Washers, Dryers and Dishwashers
43. April,
card

1984 Memo re: Warranty Ultrafiche notice and Ultrafiche

44. Promotional Buying Worksheet,
54--12,166

Shewan Déposition Exhibit

45. Monthly Sales Plan, November,
49-^12,161

1984, Shewan Deposition Exhibit

46. Regular and Promotional Sales Report,
56--12,168

Shewan Deposition Exhibit

47. Event Recap Report, Shewan Deposition Exhibit 55--12,167
48. Monthly Line Analyses for 1984 and 1985 for Augusta, Bangor,
Brunswick, Lewiston and South Portland stores
49. Video tape M-13 Quarterly Training 84-707-1V
50. Video tape M-13 Quarterly Training 84-707-2V
51. 1984 Service Orders for Maintenance Agreement Calls for
Refrigerators, Freezers, Washers, Dryers, Microwave Ovens, Video
Cassette Recorders, Ranges, Televisions, Vacuum Cleaners and
Dishwashers for South Portland, Maine, Sears Service Department
52. Kennebec Journal article entitled "State Files Lawsuit Against
Sears", March 31, 1984
53. Morning Sentinal article entitled "Maine Sues Sears Over Ad
Tactics", March 31, 1984
54. Bangor Daily News article entitled "Sears Charged With Deceptive
Tactics", March 31, 1984
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55. Portland Press Herald article entitled "State Charges Deception,
Sues Sears", March 31, 1984
56. Wall Street Journal article entitled "Sears Is Sued by Maine
Over Trade Practices", April 2, 1984
57. Wall Street Journal article entitled "Sears Is Sued by Maine
Over Trade Practices", April 3, 1984
58. Washington Post article entitled "Sears Contracts:
Pay", April 19, 1984

Do They

59. New York Times article entitled "Do Service Contracts Serve the
Customer?", May 12, 1984
60. Maine Sunday Telegram article entitled "State Lawyers Huddle of
Sears Trade Trial", August 5, 1984
61. Portland Press Herald article entitled "Trial Date Set for Sears
Suit", August 1, 1984
62 . United Press International article entitled "Government Focus:
Consumer Division Ferrets Out Con Men", June 24, 1984
63 . Fresno Bee article entitled "Service Contracts", August 3, 1984
64. Kennebec Journal article entitled "Sears Lawsuit Delayed",
August 15, 1984
65. Maine Sunday Telegram article entitled "The Man Who Would Be
Governor", August 19, 1984
66. Portland Press Herald article entitled "Elderly Called Targets
of Shady Sales Ethics", dated December 15, 1984
1982 Sears advertisements for sales at Maine Stores after
July 18, 1982
68. Standard No. 6 and 6A Reports for Maine Sears Stores, December,
1984
69. Deposition of the State of Maine 'and Exhibits thereto
70. Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatoaries Propounded by Sears to
the State, June 28, 1984
71. Plaintiff's First Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 1-7
Propounded by Sears to the State, November 21, 1984
72. Maintenance Agreement and Warranty Signs
73. Videotape M-13:

Quarterly Training 84-707-3V
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74. Videotape M-13:

Quarterly Training 84-707-4V

75. Sears Raincheck Certificate Form
75. Promotional Results Reports for Sears' Maine stores and Boston
Group office in Sears' possession for the period July 18, 1982
to the present
77. Regular and Promotional Sales Reports for Sears' Maine stores
and Boston Group office in Sears' possession for the period
July 18, 1982 to the present
78. Unit Reports for Sears' Maine stores and Boston Group office in
Sears' possession for the period July 18, 1982 to the present
79. Event Recap Reports for Sears' Maine stores and Boston Group
office in Sears' possession for the period July 18, 1982 to the
present
80. Promotional Buying Worksheets for Sears' Maine stores and Boston
Group office in Sears' possession for the period July 18, 1982
to the present
81. Big Ticket Sales Reports for Sears' Maine stores and Boston
Group office in Sears' possession for the period July 18, 1982
to the present
82. Monthly Activity Reports for the Boston Group applicable to
Maine Sears stores
83. Sears S-800 Warranty Bulletins
84. Sears Sales Mate Notebook
85. Sears Salesfloor Warranty Binders
85. Sears Catalog
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ATTACHMENT B
1.

Sears Employees

A.

Chicago

Joseph Dort
Donald Heifer
Paul Marx
Thomas Needham
Lowell Peters
Gordon Reichard
Michael Rowland
Walter Suva
B.

Group Office

Edward Bassuk
Dale Bucktell
Timothy Maguire
Stanley Shewan
C.

Employees of Maine Stores

Diane Bergeron, Sears, Roebuck and Co., Scarborough Service Center
Arthur Berry, Sears, Roebuck and Co., Lewiston, Maine
Thomas Biczak
N. Bissonnette
Robert Chapman
William Dunton
Leon Fowler
John Gribb
Thomas Hall, Sears, Roebuck and Co., Scarborough Service Center
Peter Lekouses
S. Littlefield
Hugh Lynch
Barry McCormick
William Rittmeyer
Joe Ross
Jerry Sandidge
Keith Stevens
Nicholas Vassilakis
Andea Wice
Virginia Young
2.

State Investigators

Margie Berkovitz
Stephen R. Dunn
Timothy Lynch
Brian MacMaster
Robert McCarthy
Richard Petry
Robert Stocker

\J
V

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, S S .

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-84-133

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)

Plaintiff

)

)

)
)

v .

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND C O .,

PLAINTIFF’S
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM

)
)

Defendant

)

At this point, the State of Maine (the "State") views its
case as factually uncomplicated.

We believe that the legal

issues can be resolved, for the most part, on a record largely
consisting of documents and depositions.
cooperation from Sears, Roebuck and Co.

Assuming reasonable
("Sears") with regard

to the admissibility of documents and the efficient use of
depositions, we anticipate our direct case can be put into
evidence in eight to nine days,

including reasonable time for

cross-examination by Sears.

(A)

Pretrial Conference

The State requests a pretrial conference.

2

(B)

Time Required

The State estimates the time required for the pre-trial
conference to be one hour.

(C)

Trial Date

The Court's Order of January 21,

1985, as amended by its

letter of February 19, 1985, sets a trial date to commence May
13, 1985.

The State has made preparations and commitments to

meet that trial date.

(D)

Time Required

The State estimates that its direct case should be put into
evidence within eight to nine days, as described more fully in
subparagraph (N) below.

(E)

Jury Demand

Trial by jury is not available.

(F)

Pending Motions

There are no pending motions at this time.

3

(G)

Statement of the Nature of the Case

The State claims that Sears has engaged in a number of
unfair and deceptive practices in connection with the sale of
maintenance agreements and in connection with the sale of
advertised products, both by engaging in a bait-and-switch
scheme and by advertising products that are unavailable for
sale at Maine Sears stores.
declaratory,

The Amended Complaint requests

injunctive and restitutional relief under the

Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.

§§

206-214 (1979 &

Supp. 1984-1985)

(the "UTPA"), the Consumer Solicitation Sales

Act, 32 M.R.S.A.

§ § 4661-4670 (1980 & Supp.

Uniform Commercial Code, 11 M.R.S.A.
Supp.

1984-1985)

(H)

1984-1985) and the

§ 1-101, et seq.

(1964 &

(the "UCC").

Legal Issues and Theories

(1)

Bait and Switch/Availability

In the First and Second Causes of Action the State alleges
that Sears regularly advertises sales when major home
appliances and other consumer goods are in fact unavailable at
the Maine Sears stores to which such advertisements apply,
that on some occasions bait and switch tactics are used in
connection with the advertisement of unavailable goods.

and

4

The principal legal issue under these two counts is whether
the acts and practices complained of constitute unfair and
deceptive trade practices in violation of Section 207 of the
UTPA.

The theory of the State is that the advertisement of

unavailable consumer goods constitutes an unfair and deceptive
trade practice, whether or not accompanied by bait and switch
tactics, and further that Sears has institutionalized retail
practices that are tantamount to bait and switch advertising
when it advertises unavailable consumer goods and the stores to
which such advertisements apply have available for sale other
goods of a type similar to those advertised but unavailable.

(2)

Sale of Maintenance Agreements

The Third, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the Amended
Complaint all have in common claims of unfair and deceptive
corporate practices in connection with the sale of maintenance
agreements, the coverage of which in some respects is unneeded
as a matter of law and in other respects is unnecessary as a
matter of fact.
The State claims that Sears engages in unfair and deceptive
trade practices when it fails to disclose the existence and
extent of the substantial duplication of coverage between the
maintenance agreement coverage and consumer rights under

5

express warranties and the implied warranty of
merchantability.

The principal issue involved here is the

extent of such duplication, which in turn raises the issue of
the scope and duration of the implied warranty.

The State's

legal theory on this point is set forth in the relief sought in
the Third and Fourth Causes of Action with regard to
disclosure.

An associated legal issue is whether Sears should

be required to undertake affirmative advertising to remedy its
past and present failure to disclose the duplication of
coverage.

The State's position is that such corrective

advertising is justified and appropriate to fully remedy the
violations of the UTPA and UCC alleged.
The State also claims that Sears engages in unfair and
deceptive trade practices in selling its maintenance agreements
and servicing appliances by disclaiming the implied warranty of
merchantability.

The disclaimer takes place in part at the

point of sale of the maintenance agreements through written and
oral sales presentations to consumers.

Sears represents to

consumers that, absent a maintenance agreement, Sears is
obligated only by the express warranty to pay for parts and
labor to repair defects in material or workmanship.

These

unfair and deceptive representations are compounded by Sears'
practice of excluding the implied warranty at the point where
service is requested by customers who have not purchased

6

maintenance agreements.

With the addition of the issue of

whether Sears attempts to disclaim the implied warranty,

in

violation of the UTPA and UCC, the legal issues raised here are
the same as those for failure to disclose the duplication of
coverage.
The State contends further that Sears violates the UTPA by
misrepresenting and failing to disclose the actual need for and
value of maintenance agreements.

Among other things, Sears

overstates the coverage actually provided by the maintenance
agreements.

Sears also exaggerates, misrepresents and does not

have an adequate basis for representations made to consumers
with regard to the likelihood that Sears'products will fail and
the need for and value of maintenance agreements.

The issue

raised is whether these acts and practices of Sears constitute
unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Section
207 of the UTPA and the UCC.
Still another part of the maintenance agreement allegations
is a product of those identified above, focused on the first
year of appliance ownership by consumers.

The State claims

that there is such a substantial degree of duplication with
warranty rights and otherwise such little value in maintenance
agreement coverage during the first year of ownership of a
covered appliance that the sale of maintenance agreements
covering this period is inherently an unfair and deceptive
trade practice in violation of the UTPA.

7

(3)

Consumer Solicitation Sales Act

The Sixth Cause of Action claims that Sears sells
maintenance agreements through unsolicited telephone contacts
by telephone solicitation representatives without providing the
consumer with a written contract bearing the signature of Sears
and the consumer in violation of 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662, the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, and Section 207 of the UTPA.
The legal issues raised here relate to an interpretation of the
Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, which the State contends
clearly prohibits the practices of Sears in telephone
solicitation of maintenance agreements.

(4)

Sears Defenses

In its Answer to the Amended Complaint,

Sears raises

numerous defenses that have been articulated only in the most
general fashion, including failure to state a claim, statutes
of limitations, preemption, equal protection,
rule-making.
without merit.

and unauthorized

The State contends that all of these defenses are

8
(I)

Unusual Legal Issues

The State believes that it would be inappropriate for any
portion of this case to be tried in camera.
ironic, to say the least,

It would be

if a suit charging a defendant with

deceptive trade practices against the public were to be tried
in secrecy.

Pursuant to a Protective Order dated July 18,

1984, most of the discovery documents made available to the
State by Sears, and therefore most of the trial exhibits
identified herein by the State, have been designated as
"confidential" by Sears.

As contemplated by paragraph 1 of the

Protective Order, the State intends to challenge the
confidentiality designation of virtually all of these exhibits,
with few exceptions such as for those exhibits containing
financial data.

At such point Sears will have the burden of

establishing the confidential nature of the challenged exhibits
and some rulings will be necessary from the Court as to how to
conduct the trial with regard to those exhibits established as
confidential.

J.

Status of Discovery

Discovery is almost completed.

The State has no further

depositions scheduled except for any experts which Sears may
designate.

Sears still has not completed its response to

9

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories No. 7 despite repeated
promises and a Court order to do so.

There are some

documents which Sears has yet to supply under the Document
Request.

Finally,

Sears has expressed its intention (to which

the State has not objected) to take a small number of
additional depositions of consumers.

(K)

Proposed Stipulations and Admissions

The State proposes that Sears stipulate to the following:
(1)

All the proposed trial exhibits listed in

Attachment A hereto are authentic and admissible at
trial subject to relevancy objections.
(2)

The final draft report listed as Exhibit 36 in

Attachment A, entitled "Life Cycle Performance of
Small Appliances," is a later version of Dort
Deposition Exhibit 2, resulting from editing by Daniel
Stokesberry.
(3)

All the depositions of Sears employees,

Maine employees,

including

are admissible as the direct

testimony of the State of such witnesses, without
restricting the State's right to call such witnesses
for limited direct testimony.

10
(L)

Documents To Be Produced

Pursuant to Rule 43(h) of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure, the State requests Sears to produce at trial the
originals of all Sears documents listed in Attachment A hereof.

(M)

List of Plaintiff's Exhibits

Although almost done, discovery is not entirely complete.
Moreover,

at this point, two months in advance of trial, the

State has not yet given final analysis of all the exhibits it
intends to introduce at trial.

Accordingly, while the list of

exhibits set forth in Attachment A hereto constitutes most of
the exhibits which the State will introduce at trial, the State
reserves the opportunity to add to that list with reasonable
notice to Sears.

(N)

List of Plaintiff's Witnesses

Appended hereto as Attachment B is a list of witnesses
which the State presently intends to call at trial.

The State

does not represent that it will call or produce such witnesses
and reserves the right to add to the list as provided in M.R.
Civ. P. 16(a)(3)(N).
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As outlined below, the State predicts that its direct case
can be put on within eight to nine days, including reasonable
cross-examination by Sears.

(1)

Consumer Witnesses

Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P.

32(a)(3)(E), the State hereby makes

application to the Court and gives notice to Sears that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the
interests of justice and with due regard to the importance of
live testimony to allow the depositions of most of the consumer
witnesses to be used in lieu of live testimony.

Live consumer

witness testimony is estimated at two days.

(2)

Sears Employees

The State proposes to introduce the testimony of all the
Boston and Chicago Sears employees whose depositions have been
taken through deposition pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2)
(3).

The State also proposes to introduce the deposition

testimony of Maine Sears employees as its direct testimony,
hereby making application to the Court and giving notice to
Sears pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3)(E),

subject to the limited

brief live direct testimony of the following witnesses:

and
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John Gribb
Leon Fowler
Andrea Wice
William Dunton
Mary McCormick
T. Biczak
H. Lynch
N. Vassilakis
N. Bissonette
P. Lekouses
S. Littlefield
It is predicted that the direct and cross-examination of these
employees will take approximately four to five days.

(3)

Former Sears Employees

Sears has still not provided the State with a complete list
of former employees requested in discovery,

notwithstanding

repeated promises to do so and a court order that it do so.
Any such former employees offered at trial will take less than
day.

(4)

State Investigators

The testimony of State investigators, together with former
Sears employees, will take one day.

(5)

Maine Retailers

The testimony of these witnesses is estimated at one day.
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(6)

Other

The State will offer the testimony of one or more of it
employees for purposes of introduction of prepared exhibits
The testimony should take just minutes if not stipulated to

(O)

Reports of Physicians

Not applicable.

(P)

Damages

The State prays for restitution on behalf of consumers in
the Third and Fourth Causes of Action of the Amended
Complaint.

The extent of such damages,

cannot be itemized in advance of trial.

although substantia 1 ,
The State proposes

that a separate proceeding take place following a ruling on
issues of liability under the third and fourth counts to no tify
consumers of their rescission rights.

(Q)

View

No view is requested.
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(R)

Special Verdict

Not applicable

(S)

Settlement

Settlement discussions have taken place between the
parties.

These discussions have not been productive,

and in

the State’s view, further settlement discussions are not
warranted.

(T)

Learned Treatises

None are intended to be offered at this time.

Dated:

March 15, 1985

Respectfully submitted,

RUFUS E . BROWN
Deputy Attorney General
STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Assistant Attorney General
PETER J . BRANN
Assistant Attorney General
JAMES McKENNA
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME
04333
Attorneys for Plaintiff
State of Maine

*

Exhibit A to
Plaintiff 's
Pre-Trial Memorandum

LIST OF PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS

1.

Stipulation dated June 19, 1984.

2.

Plaintiff's First (Amended) Request for Documents, dated
August 20, 1984.

3.

Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, dated August
20, 1984.

4.

Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories dated September 21, 1984.

5.

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff’s First (Amended)
Request for Production of Documents from Defendant, dated
September 24, 1984.

6.

Plaintiff's Second Request for Production of Documents
dated November 5, 1984.

7.

Defendant's Response to Second Request for Documents,
dated December 10, 1984.

8.

Defendant's First Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's
Interrogatories, dated January 5, 1985.

9.

Plaintiff’s Third Request for Production of Documents,
dated January 4, 1985.

10

Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions, dated February
6, 1985.

11

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's First Request for
Admissions, dated February 15, 1985.
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Depositions and Deposition Exhibits:
a.

Deposition of John Gribb, dated June 6, 7, 11, 29,
1984 and Gribb Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-77.

2

b.

Deposition of Leon E. Fowler, dated June 21, 1984
and Fowler Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-6.

c.

Deposition of Andrea Wice, dated June 21, 1984 and
Wice Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-12.

d.

Deposition of Virginia P. Young, dated June 28, 1984
and Young Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-3.

e.

Deposition of Jerry Sandidge, dated July 11, 1984
and Sandidge Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-8.

f.

Deposition of William Dunton, dated July 12, 1984
and Dunton Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-14.

g.

Deposition of Stanley Shewan, dated July 18, 1984
and Shewan Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-66.

h.

Deposition of Robert Chapman, dated July 19, 1984
and Chapman Deposition Exhibits 1-3.

i.

Deposition of Joe Ross, dated July 19, 1984 and Ross
Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-5.

j.

Deposition of Keith M. Stevens, dated July 27, 1984
and Stevens Deposition Exhibit No. 1.

k.

Deposition of Mary McCormick, dated August 15, 1984
and McCormick Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-4.

l.

Deposition of Gordon Reichard, dated December 12 and
14, 1984 and Reichard Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-15.

m.

Deposition of Michael Rowland, dated December 12,
1984 and Rowland Deposition Exhibit No. 1.

n.

Deposition of Thomas Needham, dated December 13,
1984 and Needham Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-20.

o.

Deposition of Walter Suva, dated December 14, 1984
and Suva Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-9.

p.

Deposition of Lowell Peters, dated February 4 and 6,
1985 and Peters Deposition Exhibits 1-70.

q.

Deposition of Donald Heifer, dated February 6, 1985
and Heifer Deposition Exhibit No. 1.
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r.

Deposition of Joseph J. Dort, dated February 7, 1985
and Dort Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-2.

s.

Deposition of Paul Marx, dated Feruary 7, 1985 and
Marx Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1.

t.

Deposition of Edward Bassuk, dated March 4, 1985 and
Bassuk Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-12.

u.

Deposition of D. Buchtel, dated March 4, 1985 and
Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-2.

v.

Deposition of T. Biczak, dated March 6, 1985 and
Biczak Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1-11.

w.

Deposition of H. Lynch, dated March 6, 1985 and
Lynch Deposition Exhibit No. 1.

x.

Deposition of N. Vassilakis, dated March 6 and 7,
1985 and Vassilakis Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1-13.

y.

Deposition of N. Bissonette, dated March 7, 1985 and
Bissonette Deposition Exhibits Nos. 1-3.

z.

Deposition of P. Lekouses, dated March 7, 1985 and
Lekouses Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1-5.

aa.

Deposition of S. Littlefield, dated March 8, 1985
and Littlefield Deposition Exhibit No. 1.

bb.

Consumer Depositions, Deposition Exhibits,
related documents.

and

13.

A-lll, Supp. #12 Rev. "Maintenance Agreement Sales For
Division 200 Merchandise."
(January 5, 1968).
Discovery
Document Nos. 10135-36..

14.

S-822 (Part IV), "Division/Department, 22 Kenmore
Automatic Dishwasher Warranty."
(June 27, 1980).
Discovery Document No. 17229-33.

15.

M-287, "Management Responsibilities for Compliance with
FTC Ad Substantiation Cease and Desist Order Covering
Dishwashers and Other Major Home Appliances."
(September
22, 1982).
Discovery Document Nos. 15953-15961.

16.

Manual of Compliance Procedures Under Advertising
Substantiation Cease and Desist Order.
Discovery
Documents No. 15930-52.

s\
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17.

A-529 Rev., "Service to Customers and Parts Income"
(February 19, 1982).
Discovery Document Nos. 18864-78.

18 .

S-731, Section VI Rev. (February 20, 1981), "Service to
Customers Pricing Policies."
Discovery Document Nos.
18,876-8.

19 .

Standard 6 and 6A Reports for and the Maine Stores, year
end, 1980 through 1984.

20 .

Standard 6 and 6A Reports for the National Market, year
end 1980-1984.
Discovery Document Nos. 19240-19249.

21.

Store W/S # 4 Division Analysis of Sales and Maintenance
Agreements, January-May 1984.
Discovery Document Nos.
12161-12201.

22 .

Maintenance Agreement Price Lists (1980-1985).

23 .

D/731A National Service Department Personnel.
Document Nos. 15146-50.

24 .

D817 Organizational Chart.
01396A-98A.

25.

RIM Manual 1982.

26 .

Division Manager's Manual.

27.

M-13 Overview (First Quarter Training).
Document No. 16106.

28 .

"M-13: 2nd Quarter."

29 .

Sears: M-13: 3rd Quarter.
16114-17.

30 .

Meeting Leader's Guide (M-13) August 1984.
Document Nos. 16118-9.

31.

How to Help Customers Get More for Their Money (Part 1),
Discovery Document Nos. 16134-44.

32 .

How to Help Customers Get More for Their Money (Part 2),
Discovery Document Nos. 16145-53.

33 .

Maintenance Agreements: Basic Training.
Document Nos. 14916-23.

Discovery

Discovery Document Nos.

Discovery Document Nos.

13507-13565.

Discovery

Discovery Document Nos. 16110-11.
Discovery Document Nos.
Discovery

Discovery
«
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34 .

Current MA Promotion Specifications.
Nos. 15373-95.

Discovery Document

35.

Selling Sears Big Ticket Merchandise: Basic Training.
Discovery Document Nos. 17384-17405.

36 .

Draft Final Report, "Life Cycle Performance of Small
Appliances," Daniel P. Stokesberry (July 1978).

37.

Lab Report, 82 RC 2575.0.
17197-201.

Discovery Document Nos.

38 .

Lab Report, 83 RC 0120.0.
15789-90 .

Discovery Document Nos.

39 .

Lab Report, 83 RC 1625.

40 .

Lab Report, 83 RH 2961.0.
15690-700.

41.

MSA Report 93, J a n .-December 1982, 1983 and 1984.

42 .

1985 Maintenance Agreement Rationale.

43 .

MA Survey, 9-83.

44 .

Par Pricing Manual (1984) Discovery Document Nos.
013846-014136.

45 .

Sears 10-K (1983 and 1984).
013680-013724.

46 .

Sears Annual Report (1983 and 1984).

47.

Sears Catalogue, Spring/Summer 1984.

48 .

Dishwasher Service Manual.
17857-17949.

49 .

Dryer Repair Manual.

50 .

Auditor's Manual,

51.

Warranty and Credit Guide.

52 .

Sears advertisements and ad corrections, July 1982 to
present.

53 .

Promotional Results Report, July 1984-to present.

54 .

Regular and Promotional Sales Reports, July to present.

Discovery Document Nos.

17218-28

Discovery Document Nos.

Discovery 15,400-501.

Discovery Document Nos.

Discovery Document Nos.

Discovery Document Nos. 17956-18146

Discovery Document Nos.

18974-76.
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55 .

Memorandum of David Berch dated August 17, 1984.
Discovery Documents No. 14544.

56 .

Memorandum of Lowell Peters to Territorial Service
Managers, November 15, 1982.
Discovery Document Nos.
17649-50.

57.

Memorandum from Lowell Peters to Messrs. Galloway, et
al., December 30, 1983.
Discovery Document Nos. 17657-58.

58 .

Memorandum from P. W. Hubbard to Store Managers, March
15, 1984.
Discovery Document No. 16598.

59 .

Memorandum from S. N. Shewan to John Gribb, July 21,
1983.
Discovery Document No. 17236.

60 .

Memorandum from S. N. Shewan to T. Biczak, July 21,
1983.
Discovery Document No. 17234.

61.

Memorandum from Alan Scholl to S. N. Shewan, June 16,
1984.
Discovery Document No. 17257.

62 .

Memorandum from L .A . Moeberg to Shewan.
Documents Nos. 17255-56.

63 .

Memorandum from P. W. Hubbard to Greg Pennell, July 9,
1984.
Discovery Document No. 17350.

64 .

Memorandum from P. W. Hubbard to Caroline Mclntire, July
3, 1984.
Discovery Document No. 17347.

65.

Memorandum from P. W. Hubbard to Leon Fowler, July 3,
1984.
Discovery Document No. 17349.

66

.

Discovery

Memorandum from Paul W. Zarenkiewicz, August 18, 1981.
Discovery Document No. 013829.

67.

Memorandum of William J. Lynott to Group Managers,
February 7, 1983.
Discovery Document Nos. 16757-60.

68 .

Memorandum from P. W. Hubbard to Store Managers, March
22, 1984, June 15, 1984 and October 9, 1984 re MA Sales
Penetration Goal.
Discovery Document Nos. 16599, 17277,
16611.

69 .

Undated Letters of A.A. Delmolino to Mr. Biczak.
Discovery Document Nos. 19250, 19251.
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70.

Memorandum from Tim McGuire to Store Managers, February26, 1985 with attachments.
Discovery Document Nos.
19756-60.

71.

Store Maintenance Agreement Sales, week ending 2/23/85.
Discovery Document No. 19261.

72.

Letters of Steven R. Dunn and N. G. Vassilakis, February
2, 1982.
Discovery Document Nos. 19262-67.

73.

Letter of Jerry Crowe to Charles Gaw, August 6, 1984 with
attachments.
Discovery Document Nos. 19268-72.

74.

Letter of Charles Gaw to John Berman, August 9, 1984.
Discovery Document Nos. 19273-74.

75.

Minutes of Quarterly Review Meeting, August 1-3,
Discovery Document Nos. 19275-83.

1984.

Attachment B to
Plaintiff 's
Pre-Trial Memorandum
LIST OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES
(1)

Consumer Witnesses
ADAMS, JAMES
P.O. Box 1095
Auburn, ME 04210
ALBERT, MARY
35 Highland Avenue
Lincoln, ME 04457
BAGDOYAN, WILLIAM
Assistant District Attorney
Kennebec County Courthouse
State Street
Augusta, ME 04330
BARTON, WILLIAM
P.O. Box 2571
10 Cottage Road
S. Portland, ME 04106
BEAUDOIN, MAURICE
RFD 2, Box 848
Union, ME 04862
BEAULIEU, GERARD
P.O. Box 74
Freeport, ME 04032
BOHUNICKY, MICHAEL
59 Summer Street
Lisbon Falls, ME 04252
BRAGG, DORIS
P.O. Box 109
Windsor, ME 04363
BROWN, GERRY
RR 1, Box 347
Casco, ME 04015
BUCK, WENDY
RFD 3, Box 4840
Winthrop, ME 04364

2

CATALO, JOSEPH
5 Oakwood Terrace
Brunswick, ME 04011
CHAMBERLAIN, DAVID
RFD 2, Box 105
Greene, ME 04236
CLIFFORD, FRANK
Box 646
Damariscotta, ME 04543
COLDWELL, ARTHUR
6 Forest Lane
West Buxton, ME 04093
COLELLO, MATT
RFD 2, Box 9915
Alfred, ME 04002
COYNE, JAMES
32 Boothby Avenue
S. Portland, ME 04106
CYR, RICHARD
16 McKinley Street
Bangor, ME 04401
DANFORTH, STANLEY
470 Elm Street
Biddeford, ME 04005
DAVENPORT, SUSAN
1291 Washington Street
Bath, ME 04530
DEARBORN, ERROL
1 Arch Street
Richmond, ME 04357
DILLINGHAM, PAULETTE
RFD 2, Box 1843
Hampden, ME 04444
FRAZIER, LEWIS
RD 1, Box 3020
Dresden, ME 04342
GAGNE, DONNA
Smithwheel
Old Orchard Beach, ME 04064
GOULD, LEO
Box 16
N. Whitefield, ME 04353

3

GROVER, LEON/JUDITH
Box 245
Wiscasset, ME 04578
GUERRETTE, MICHELLE
Clerk's Office
Kennebec County Superior Court
95 State Street
Augusta, ME 04330
HARRELL, BRENT
P.O. Box 11
Coopers Mills, ME 04341
HARRIS, BRICE
12 Church Street, Apt. 3
Augusta, ME 04330
HATCH, WAYNE
RFD 1, Box 630
Gardiner, ME 04345
HAYES, ROBERT
80 Revere Street, Apt 3
Portland, ME 04103
HAYWARD, JAN
P.O. Box 145
Bowdoinham, ME 04008
HE I D , DAVID
57 Hartley Street
Portland, ME 04104
HINDES, GEORGE
Box 488
Hancock, ME 04640
HUGHES, SHIRLEY
113 Gorham Road
Scarborough, ME 04074
HUNT, PHILIP
250 Main Street
Cumberland, ME 04021
HUNTINGTON, HERB &
MADELINE
Box 202
Milford, ME 04461

4

HUNTLEY, DWIGHT
RFD 1, Box 5 OA
Columbia Falls, ME 04623
HURD, MARTHA
232 High St. #4
Portland, ME 04104
JONES, ROY
Cross Road
W. Southport, ME 04576
LARRABEE, HARRY
Route 5, Box 495
Ellsworth, ME 04605
LEARY, EDWARD
Box 1100
Palermo, ME 04354
LEARY, MAL
17 Pike Street
Augusta, ME 04330
LINDSEY, RICHARD
111 Madeline Street
Portland, ME 04103
MACLEOD, KENNETH
14 Allen Road
Brewer, ME 04412
MARTIN, BRIAN
Pine Hill Apts. #5-B
Farmingdale, ME 04345
MCNULTY, TRUDILYN
319 Woodford St.
Portland, ME 04103
MILBURY, JEAN
Route 112
RFD 1, Box 382
Saco, ME 04072
MILESKI, DURRELL
19 Mitton Street
Portland, ME 04102
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MOO R E , RODNEY
Poland
ME 04273
MORGAN, KEVIN
P.O. Box 3091
Auburn, ME 04210
MORRISON, ROBERT
38 Pleasant Street
Milo, ME 04463
ODENCRANTZ, ED
17 Smith Street
Augusta, ME 04330
PARSONS, SHARRILYN
P.O. Box 29
Carmel, ME 04419
PATTERSON, DENNIS
98 Maine Street
Brunswick, ME 04011
PELLETIER, MICHAEL
Box 293
Presque Isle, ME 04769
PROVENCHER, ROGER
P.O. Box 247
Sanford, ME 04073
RICHARDSON, KEVIN
RFD 3, Box 75
1 Patrick Street
Augusta, ME 04330
ROFFLER, BOB
10 Deering St.
Portland, ME 04101
ROUNDS, TIMOTHY
7 Porter Street
South Paris, ME 04281
SAVAGE, HAROLD
5 Mayflower Road
Augusta, ME 04330

- 6 -

SCHMIEKS, THERESA
Route 2
PO. Box 1096
Auburn, ME 04210
SCOTT, ROBERT
RFD 1, Box 2920
Leeds, ME 04263
SHAW, WAYNE
1431 High Street
Bath, ME 04530
SHUTT, CAROL
RFD 1, Box 30
Cherryfield, ME 04622
SMITH, GARY
18 Pleasant Street
Gardiner, ME 04345
STADLER, EUNICE
1 Pine Tree Lane
P.O. Box 132
S. Thomaston, ME 04858
STENGLE, CINDY
RR 1, Box 564A
N. Windham, ME 04062
STEVENS, SHARON
South Belfast Avenue
RFD 1, Box 264
Augusta, ME 04330
STONE, VERN & MARY
Rt. 2, Box 119
Pittston, ME 04345
STOUT, ELIZABETH
RR 1, Box 302
W. Gorham, ME 04038
THOMAS, JERRY
P. O. Box 82
Lisbon, ME 04250
TOMAN, MICHAEL
Riverside Mobile Home Park
Augusta, ME 04330

7

TRIPP, CONSTANCE
RFD

1

Livermore Falls, ME 04254
WALTON, CLEMENT
Route 27, Box 65
N. Edgecomb, ME 04556
WHEELER, JAMES
Riverside Drive
Mechanic Falls, ME 04256
WHITE, LINDA
Box 142
Smyrna Mills, ME 04780
WILLETTE, ROBERT
RFD 4, Box 1022
Summerhaven Road
Augusta, ME 04330
WILLIAMS, REBECCA
R t . 1, Box 444
Orr's Island, ME 04066
YOULAND, DENNIS
RR 1, Box 1185
Old Stage Road
Woolwich, ME 04579

(2)

State Investigators
BERKOVICH, MARGIE
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME
04333
DUNN, STEVEN R .
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME
04333
LYNCH, TIMOTHY
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME
04333

8
MacMASTER, BRIAN
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME 04333
M c Ca r t h y , R o b e r t
A ttorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME 04333
PETRIE, RICHARD
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME 04333
STOCKER, RICHARD
Attorney General’s Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME 04333

(3)

Sears Employees
BASSUK, EDWARD
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Boston Group
Natick, Massachusetts
BICZAK, T.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
400 Maine Mall
South Portland, ME
BISSONETTE, N.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Lewiston Mall
Lewiston, ME 04240
BUCHTEL, D.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Boston Group
Natick, Massachusetts
CHAPMAN, ROBERT
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330

T

M

V
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DORT, JOSEPH J.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
DUNTON, WILLIAM
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Cook's Corner Shopping Center
Brunswick, ME
FOWLER, LEON
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME 04330
GRIBB, JOHN
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME 04330
HELFER, DONALD
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
LEKOUSES, P.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Bangor Mall
Bangor, ME 04401
LITTLEFIELD, S.
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Bangor Mall
Bangor, ME 04401
MARX, PAUL
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
LYNCH, H .
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
400 Maine Mall
South Portland, ME
McCORMICK, MARY
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Cook's Corner Shopping Center
Brunswick, ME

10
NEEDHAM, THOMAS
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
PETERS, LOWELL
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
REICHARD, GORDON
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
ROSS, JOSEPH
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330
ROWLAND, MICHAEL
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
SANDIDGE, JERRY
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330
SHEWAN, STANLEY
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Boston Group
Natick, Massachusetts
STEVENS, KEITH
Sears, Roebuck and C
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330
SUVA, WALTER
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
VASSILAKIS, N.
Sears, Roebuck and Co
Lewiston Mall
Lewiston, ME
04240

y

í

.

- il WICE, ANDREA
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330
YOUNG, VIRGINIA
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Whitten Road
Augusta, ME
04330
(4)

Maine Retailers
AGREN, DOUGLAS
Agren Appliance Service Co.
178 Turner Street
Auburn, ME
04210
DUNNETT, WILLIAM
Dunnett, Inc.
Penobscot Plaza
Bangor, ME
04401
POMERLEAU, ROGER
Frank X. Pomerleau, Inc.
43 Bridge Street
Augusta, Maine
04330
RENY, ROBERT H.
R e n y 's Department Store
RR# 1
Damariscotta, ME
04543
SEAVEY, TIMOTHY
Seavey's Furniture & Appliance
Route 302
North Windham, ME
04062

(5)

Other
LAMOTHE, ART
Attorney General's Office
State House Station #6
Augusta, ME
04333

C

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-84-133

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
vs.

OPINION and ORDER

SEARS, ROEBUCK and
COMPANY,
Defendant

This matter is before the Court.on complaint by the State,
through the Department of the Attorney General, charging Defendant
Sears,

Roebuck

Practices Act,

Company,
5 M.R.S.A.

with violations
§ 207,

of the Unfair

Trade

and the Consumer Solicitation

Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. 4661 et seq., in certain of their business
operations within the State of Maine.

Specifically,

in a six

count complaint, amended, the Attorney General alleges violations
in three general areas:
—

Certain

result,
sale,

of

on occasion,
during the

Sears

sales and advertising practices which

in advertised goods being unavailable

peri o d

of

sale,

at

Sears

retail

for

stores are

alleged to be unfair trade practices.
-- Sears
alleges,
of

goods

sale

are induced
sold,

of m a intenance

agreements which,

by misrepre s e n t a t i o n s

mi s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

as

to

the State

as to the quality

the necessity for a

trade practices.

For purposes of this

"unavailability" portion

of the opinion, "advertising" means advertising of goods at special
prices for

sale

period of time.

at that price

duri n g

a specific and

limited

"Sale" means the offering of goods for a special,

lower price during a specific and limited period of time.
Some types of Sears sales advertisements caution that goods
are available

in

or at

locations.

limited

attack in this

limited numbers,
Such

or

in

limited

promotions

quantities,

are not subject to

suit, which is focused on sales practices which

do not include such limitations on the sale.
Specifically, the complaints are as follows:
1.
practice

The Attorney General claims that as a matter of general
"white

goods,"l

advertised for sale are not actually

kept in stock at Sears stores, but are stored at central warehouses
and then delivered

to

stores

fourteen days after order.
when

combined

or

customers generally seven to

The State urges that this practice,

with the advertising circulars and statements

in

the advertising circulars that "each of these advertised items is
readily

available

for

sale

as

advertised"

amounts

to

a

misrepresentation suggesting that goods are available in stock at
stores when
delivery.

they

are not

really

in

stock ready for immediate

In addition, the State suggests that Sears does maintain

^White goods are defined to include kitchen and laundry
appliances and color console televisions, that is refrigerators,
freezers, gas and electric ranges, dishwashers, washing machines,
gas and electric dryers, and color console television sets.
This
category may also include some other large "big ticket" items
such as garden tractors and some large shop tools.

5
1.

Sears

telephone,

conducts its business in this State by mail and

through catalogue sales and through its eight retail

department stores located in Augusta, Bangor, Brunswick, Lewiston,
Presque Isle, Rockland,

South Portland,

and Waterville.

These

stores are part of the Boston Group, which in turn is part of the
Eastern Territory,

headquartered in Pennsylvania, which reports

to Sears Merchandise
sells

Group in Chicago.

Sears

advertises

in Maine a wide variety of consumer goods,

and

approximately

10,000 in all, including virtually any item normally found in or
around the home except food and other consumable items.
2.

Sears advertises "sales" at its retail department stores

in daily and weekly newspapers of general circulation in various
localities throughout the United States, including daily newspapers
published and distributed in Maine.

Such newspaper advertisements

include single page advertisements,

"pull out" inserts and "pull

out" brochures.

The "pull out": inserts and brochures are published

on a regional basis.

The inserts circulated in the northern New

England area normally identify the city, and the brochures identify
the city and occasionally telephone numbers of each store located
in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire and Rhode Island.2
3.

In these advertisements, Sears regularly promotes special

"sales," representing that a consumer will save a specific amount
of money in comparison to the "regular" price if the consumer
^Many examples of newspaper advertisements and inserts are
included with PI.Ex. 448(b) and Def.Ex. 379-387.

7
that Sears include in all of its special advertisements a statement
that:

"Each of these advertised items is readily available
for sale as advertised."

Further, as part of this agreement,

the practice of central

warehousing and later delivery of advertised white goods -called "major home appliances" in the order —

was specifically

approved.
6.

Briefly stated, the "M-13 Policy" advises Sears employees

that when a customer appears
been

specially advertised,

to the floor display model
item are to be

explained,

and

asks

about

not

of the
and

the

item,
sales

available

on the

the

features

customer

to

advertised

the

customer

to

attempt

item,

indicates desire to buy the item,

get

the

If the customer asks
other,

Further,
the Sears

employee must offer to write up an order for the item,
also attempt

of

person must

different priced products may be shown to the customer.
once the

has

the customer must be taken directly

to sell the customer the advertised item.
about features

an item that

but may

"trade up" by suggesting

that the customer look at a higher priced item with more features
to assure that the customer is getting all the features he wants.
Sales people
to the advertised

are instructed that all discussions

relating

item must positively comment on its features.

No negative comments relating to the advertised item are allowed.
If the advertised

item

is not

actually available for sale in

9

Of particular significance is the extent to which the

consumer

testimony, and investigator testimony, at trial frequently indicates
little or no effort, initiated by Sears
customers

sales persons,

to shift

to higher priced models when advertised models were

unavailable,

instead

the reports

indicate

a concentration

on

selling, ordering, or rainchecking the unavailable product.
9.

Unavailability problems were addressed by approximately

50 consumers, some individuals addressing more than one incident.
(a) Three consumer problems appear to have resulted from an
error

in the copy of the ad or a misreading of the ad itself,

rather than the product not being in the store.

Such errors do

happen, see discussion of VCR availability, infra.
(b)
Sears

In two other instances, both involving air-conditioners,

had published

a corrective

ad,

noting that due to high

demand caused by a period of unusually hot weather,

Sears

had

sold out of the advertised air-conditioners.
(c)

Five consumers reported store unavailability of white

goods ordinarily stocked in central warehouses.
(d)
for

the

In 29 instances, Sears obtained the advertised product
customer

or substituted

a higher priced product with

comparable features at the sale price.
In five of these cases, Sears obtained the product, but the
customer cancelled the order or decided not to purchase it when
it came in pursuant to a rain check.
not to purchase occurred because the

Generally,

this decision

product became

available

later than the consumer had thought it would b& available.
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in midsummer finally available in mid-February (Hayward).
The Court

adopts

the

above

observations -of the consumer

statements as findings of fact.

White Goods:
There is no dispute regarding the white goods.
is to keep white goods —
—

Sears policy

even those advertised at special sales

in central warehouses.

When goods are ordered at the store,

they are then requisitioned for delivery from the central warehouse
to the

store

or

the

customer,

with delivery usually occurring

7 to 14 days after the customer's order is entered.

The timing

of the delivery may vary depending on the nature of the products
and whether

the

goods

are kept

at

central

warehouses

or are

delivered direct from the factory on what are called "hot trucks".
Delivery to the

customer's

home

is paid

for

by the

customer

whether the purchase was in stock at the store or ordered from a
central warehouse.
Beyond

the

policy of not maint a i n i n g white goods at the

stores, Sears attempts to discourage store managers and division
managers from building up stocks of white goods, at the store.
The policy of maintaining white goods at central warehouses,
now in effect for over a decade,
Sears practices

where

Sears

represents a shift from older

attempted

to maintain

stocks

of

popular goods at stores and sell white goods from those stocks.
The purpose of this more recent policy is to achieve the efficiencies

13

items, and then induce the customers to purchase higher priced
unadvertised white goods items.
The evidence relating to white goods available at Sears
stores rather evidently demonstrates no particular pattern relating
to what white goods are actually available at particular Sears
stores.

Cancelled orders, damaged goods and other haphazard

events dictate what white goods will be in the warehouse at any
particular store at any particular time.
evidence of actual customer experience —

Further, the limited
the consumer depositions

and the testimony of State investigators —

fails to indicate any

particular pattern of sales efforts to upgrade consumers from
intended purchases.
Absent evidence of such a plan to upgrade customers by
advertising unavailable goods, the only remaining issue, purely
a question of law, becomes whether the central warehousing program
by itself, taken with the advertisements, constitutes an unfair
trade practice by suggesting, as the State alleges, that goods
are actually available at the stores.
As already noted, pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission's
order, each Sears advertisement includes a statement that:
"Each of these advertised items is readily
available for sale as advertised."
The reasonable import of the statement is that the goods are
indeed available at the store.

The examination of consumer Brent

Harrell represents an expectable citizen view of this phrase.

15

in interpreting the law. 6

Thus, § 207-1 specifies:

"It is the intent of the Legislature that in construing
this sec t i o n the courts will be guided b y .the
interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission
and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time
to time amended."
But for the strong legislative mandate to follow Federal
Trade Commission direction, the Court's view of the "each items
available" statement might be different in light of the substantial
evidence of Sears availability problems.
Even independent of the Federal Trade Commission position,
the Court can find no unfair trade practice in Sears central
warehousing of advertised white goods.
that most consumers,

Common sense dictates

responding to advertisements for white

goods, do not expect to go to Sears, plunk down the money, toss
the resulting freezer or washing machine in the back seat and*
1
6There may also be a question of the extent to which Sears
white goods sales practices, being subject to an F.T.C. order,
are exempt from § 207 in light of 5 M.R.S.A. § 208-1 which provides:
"Exceptions.
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to:
1. Regulatory boards. Transactions or actions otherwise
permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory
board or officer acting under statutory authority of
the State or of the United States; or ...."
Because of the resolution of the white goods question, the
Court need not examine the extent to which white goods sales are,
or are not, fully covered by the 1977 Federal Trade Commission's
order.
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likely to mislead

consumers

acting

reasonably

under

the

circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice
is material."

Id. at p. 22,94 9.

The State has proven no such

unfairness, deception or risk of misleading in the evidence
relating to practices for sale advertising and central warehousing
of white goods.

Store Stock Goods;
Beyond the central warehousing of white goods, the State
also challenges practices whereby Sears advertises for sale
items normally kept in store stocks which are not in fact available
during the sales period.
Sears sells approximately 10,000 products from hundreds of
stores throughout the country.

As a matter of general practice,

Sears engages in an average of two newspaper insert promotions
per week, plus other promotions which are advertised directly on
the pages of newspapers.

Planning for Sears promotions starts as

much as a year in advance of the promotion, and serious planning
generally begins approximately six months before the promotion is
to appear in the newspapers.

The promotions are generally planned

at a national or regional ("group") level and without regard as
to what particular stocks of goods may exist in any particular
store.

Local stores have no role in planning promotions.

The

weekly promotions are generally developed to include many advertised
items and also a large number of promoted items that are not
advertised,

but appear in stores as unadvertised specials.

19

corrections occasioned by such general product unavailability are
required each year.

These corrections, like contents labels on

junk foods and State legal advertisements, are probably only read
by the most fastidious of readers.
2.

Store unavailability:

Additionally,

products may be

unavailable because the computerized stocking program relating
to particular stores, or even stores in particular states, has
failed to make sufficient products available during the sale
period.

The promotional results reports indicate that promoted

products frequently will be unavailable, or only available in
demonstrator —

not for sale —

models at particular stores.

In

such .instances of unavailability which relates to particular
stores that is not group-wide, the evidence is in conflict as to
whether, and to what extent, efforts are made to publish corrections
in local newspapers appropriate for particular stores indicating
unavailability o-f the product.

The Court finds that there is no

general plan or system to assure that notice is given of product
unavailability restricted to particular stores, even where stores
may be aware of the unavailability problem sufficiently in advance
of the promotion to publish a corrective notice.

Frequently in

such circumstances of store unavailability, corrections are not
published.
3.

Demand unavailability:

A third problem of availability

develops when unexpected demand surges cause goods stocked for
a special sale to be unavailable at the start of or at some
period during the sale.

An example of this was a heavy demand
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approximately the same time period.
As the post-trial briefs of the State and Sears demonstrate,
these compilations of numbers can be subject to widely differing
interpretations.

Because these widely differing interpretations

have been offered, the Court attempted to independently relate
the available promotional results reports to available advertising
documents.

However, that review has demonstrated to the Court

only that development of any statistically consistent analysis in
which the Court can have confidence is beyond the Court's abilities.
This occurs for several reasons:
First, the available promotional results reports and summaries
of goods available in Maine stores have generally been prepared
to reflect weekly reporting, for example for the week of July 29,
1984 to August 4, 1984 or the week of September 2, 1984 to September
8,

1984.

However, many of the advertisements cover only parts of

those periods, with one model number of a product featured in one
ad, and another model number or numbers of a product featured in
other ads.

This makes it difficult to read the promotional

results reports to get an accurate picture of what models were
"available" in the "begin on hand" category when a particular ad
appeared.
Second, the advertisements were presented to the Court by
file folder on a monthly basis, but all jumbled together, requiring
the Court to attempt to organize the documents in a coherent
fashion.

For example, the "October, 1984" file in Pi.Ex. 448(b)

includes a November 4 to November 10 circular and

6

duplicate ads.
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of those reports and summaries with available advertisements,
demonstrates significant problems of unavailability.

While the

volume of work represented in developing these appendixes must
have been significant,
presented.

the Court cannot accept the analysis

First, they are presented on a weekly basis while

many published advertisements are for periods of less than one
week.

Second, the evidence does not support the Attorney General's

claim that a store should expect to sell five or more units of an
advertised model during a promotional period.

Third, the Court's

review of the appendixes in comparison with the advertisements
and the promotional

results reports has

demonstrated many

inaccuracies.
Review of the analysis in Appendix E presenting availability
statistics for video cassette recorders for October, 1984, as an
example only, demonstrates significant analysis errors.
E lists

8®

VCR

m o d e l s

^ as advertised in the September 30 to

November 3, 1984 time period.
1984" file in Pi.Ex.

Appendix

The Court's review of the "October,

448(b) indicates that 13 VCR models were

advertised in this same time period.

The incorrectly reported

models were:
^Model 5330-5332 sometimes appears as one model, 5330-32, in
the October 28 to November 3 week; it is treated in this analysis
as 2 models.
^A model, in this discussion, means one model advertised
for one week.
If the same model is advertised in a different
week, it is counted again as all analysis is on a week by week
basis.
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5-A of "Sears Labor Day Sale" published and in effect during this
period.
Further confusion relating to VCR # 53161 is added by the
fact that the promotional results reports indicate that this
model normally sells for $699.00 and is marked down to $499.00,
however, the Labor Day Sale advertisement says that this same
model sells for $849.00 and is marked down to $529.00.

This

appears to be a Sears editing error.
Closer review —

again as an example — of the January, 1985

materials relating to microwave oven availability emphasize thé
difficulty, of making availability factfinding based on the ‘data
which has been provided.

Appendix D of the Appendix to Plaintiff's

Proposed Findings of Fact at pp. 148-156, and comparison with
published advertisements indicates four separate instances where
models appearing in January advertisements are incorrectly listed
in the "unadvertised" category.

The errors include one model, #

87451, which appeared with a large picture as the featured item,
in full color, taking up half the front page, of the "January 1
Sears National House Appliance Sale."
Comparison of the January, 1985 file in PI.Ex. 448 (b) with
the January,

1985 portion of Appendix D of the "Appendix to

Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact" indicates that Appendix D
lists 9 models as advertised in specific weeks for the December
30, 1984 - February 2, 1985 time period —

5 weeks.

However,

four models which were advertised in this period according to
Pi.Ex. 448(b) are listed in Appendix D as "unadvertised."

The
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87751 does not appear to have been promoted in advertisements for
the entire week of January 13-19.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 448(b),

The January advertisements.

upon which

the State

bases

it

comparisons, indicates this microwave being promoted in a circular
with prices effective January 16, 1985. The begin on hand statements
upon which the State relies, however, are effective as of January
13, 1985.

These begin on hand statements are the same as the

current on hand statements for the previous week.
In the January

6

to 12 week, microwave # 87751 shows an

unusually large number of "current on order" units.

The "current

on order" number drops off significantly for the week of January
13-19, indicating that a large number of the ordered units were
delivered in that week —

the week of the advertised promotion.

Thus it appears that greater supplies of this microwave oven were
geared to reach the stores at approximately the time —
16 —

January

that the advertised sale was scheduled to begin.
The Maine store sales, for the advertised promotion week, do

not appear to reflect any increase in sales activity for unit #
87751.

The sales figures are developed by taking the dollar

figure for sales indicated in the promotional results reports and
dividing it by the promotional price.

Where the divided number

does not come out to an even figure, the Court has presumed that
sales were the next highest number, since the Court's analysis of
promotional results reports has repeatedly indicated promotional
units being sold at less than the promoted price.
Thus,

rather than being an example of the failure of the
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87751
Microwave .Oyen, Model,,# .87751

"Regular" Price - $379.99

"Promotional" Price - $279.99

Unadvertised by promoted week of January 6 thru January 12, 1985
Advertised and promoted week of January 13 thru January 19, 1985
(only advertised January 16)
-Unadvertised but promoted week of January 20 thru January 26, 1985

begin
on hand
South Portland
Jan. 6 -12
Jan. 13-19
Jan. 20-26
Brunswick
Jan. 6 -12
Jan. 13-19
Jan. 20-26
Augusta
Jan. 6 -12
Jan. 13-19
Jan. 20-26

-1
-10
10

1
-1

sales

current
on hand

9
4
3

-10
10

2
2

-1

9

5

6

3

3
7

2
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9
5

3
7

3

-1

Lewiston
Jan. 6 - 1 2
Jan. 13-19
Jan. 20-26

11
11
22

0
1
2

11
22

Bangor
Jan. 6 - 1 2
Jan. 13-19
Jan. 20r26

2
-1
20

3
3
3

-1
20
21

19

current
on order

24
0
8

12
0
0

6
0
0

12
0
0

24
0
0

31

While precise, statistically accurate factfinding is not
possible from comparison of advertisements, promotional results
reports and availability summaries, and with consideration of the
consumer and Sears employee testimony regarding availability,
review of this evidence does lead the Court to determine that the
following generalizations can be made regarding availability
questions.

The following statements are adopted as findings of

fact by the Court:
1.

Sears publishes two or more advertising promotions a

week in its Maine markets.

These promotions regularly include

similar items, but with different model numbers.

In fact, except

for the model numbers, Sears weekly promotions taken as a whole
appear virtually indistinguishable, one from the other.
2.

The sale advertisements only represent a small fraction

of the goods that are actually promoted, many more goods of each
particular type appear in stores as unadvertised specials.

For

example, Sears promoted one microwave oven, model # 87451, in its
January 1, 1985 National Home Appliance Sale . 1 0
week,

During the same

14 other models of microwave ovens were promoted

as

unadvertised specials in Sears stores.
Similarly for the week of July 29 through August 4 , 1984 ,
one 19" color television, model # 4146, was promoted, but there
were 17 other models

just of 19" color televisions which were

promoted as unadvertised specials in stores.

A similar promotion

10Two other microwaves, # 87051 and # 87750, were advertised
in other promotions.
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Sears employees testified that such a unit would be a not for
sale demonstrator.
4.

Within the promotional results reports, no particular

patterns of availability emerged.

Sometimes the advertised

special has the most available units, sometimes unadvertised but
less expensive models have more available units, sometimes higher
priced models have more available units.

For example, in the

July 29 to August 4, 1984 time period, the promoted 19" color TV,
unit # 4246, had a begin on hand total of 745 units group wide.
Significant quantities were available in all Maine stores.

The

next closest unit in terms of availability was a less expensive
model # 42201 with 644 units in stock group wide.
5.

Advertised units tended to fall in the middle price

range in comparison with other promoted but unadvertised models.
6

.

Availability patterns in relation to price are difficult

to determine because most promotions included many low quantity
models in all price ranges.

These low quantity models tended to

be unadvertised specials.
7. There are significant availability problems for advertised
models in Maine as reflected in comparisons of advertisements and
the available promotional results reports and demonstrated repeated
instances of unavailability reported in consumer testimony.
8

.

In Maine,

it appears that the "M-13" policy goal of

having advertised goods in stores or on order prior to publication
of the advertisement is not met in practice about

10%

of the

time, although this percentage is given as an estimate based- on
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depositions —

the consumer depositions indicate that the usual

result of product unavailability, or of delays in later arrivals
of goods unavailable during the

sale period,

is

customer

dissatisfaction and loss of the sale, not upgrading to higher
priced products.
Sears —

This may be a public relations problem for

the frequent supply difficulties obviously result in

many dissatisfied customers. But, without efforts to take advantage
of consumers because of unavailability, an unfair trade is not
demonstrated.
9.

Sears unavailability problem appears to result from the

extreme complication Sears imposes on itself by having such a
vast profusion of model numbers and choosing to engage in such a
tremendous volume of sale advertising.
10.

Even with these problems of unavailable goods and

related sales procedures, the Court cannot find any pattern or
practice which is intended to deceive consumers, nor can the
Court find by a preponderance of the evidence that there is any
pattern and practice which in fact occurs, even unintended, which
deceives consumers and treats them unfairly in the market place.
11.

The Court finds that in the large majority of cases,

the "M-13" policies, as they relate to actions by sales persons,
are followed with understandable occasional deviations in a
system employing thousands of sales personnel of varying levels
of competence and respect for company policies.
sales of the same product at the same store.

Evidence of this
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so easily applied to the household hard goods at issue here.
First, the consumer's need for the item is generally less
immediate, thus the pressure to buy an available alternative is
less.
Second, offering to take orders or give rain checks are less
realistic alternatives in food sales.

One better not come home

with just a rain check when sent out to get milk for the baby.
Taking orders for unavailable goods is rare in the retail food trade.
Third, for Sears the FTC has specifically approved store
unavailability combined with willingness to sell and order,
emphasizing that the FTC does in fact contemplate that different
availability rules will apply for household goods than will apply
for food sales.
Accordingly,

the Court rejects any analysis based on food

sales availability rules.

Here, Sears is willing to sell and

seeks to sell virtually every advertised item, including those
that are temporarily out of stock in stores.

If unavailability

percentages are measured by willingness to sell, rather than in
stock, Sears availability percentage would probably fall well
within the acceptable ranges under the food rules.13
l^one area of Sears sales practices that may be closer to
the "food rule" analogy is auto parts.
Considering the vast
range of products that Sears sells, the consumer depositions
included a surprisingly high percentage of complaints of auto
parts unavailability.
This is perhaps because the need for auto
parts is frequently more urgent than the need for most household
goods -- see Jones deposition:
truck up on lift, old shocks
"burned" off when he finds that advertised shock absorbers are
unavailable and higher priced models are substituted. The Court
makes no special findings in this area, and includes this observation
in a footnote because there is insufficient evidence regarding
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agreements,

it improperly

responsibility

disclaims

its

implied warranty

to its customers in violation of 11 M.R.S.A. §

2-316-5.
The general provisions of Sears maintenance agreement read
as follows:

1.
COVERAGE AND TERM.
We will furnish parts and
service necessary to maintain the proper operating
condition for the merchandise listed on the reverse
side.
The term of this Agreement will begin on the
date issued and end on the expiration date shown on the
reverse side. Parts and service already covered under
any warranty will be provided under that warranty.
There are some limitations to the coverage and you
should review the limitations section for details.
2. LIMITATIONS OF COVERAGE.
This agreement does not
cover:
a. merchandise owned or operated outside the United
States,
b.
merchandise used for commercial purposes unless
specifically noted on the Agreement (used for any
purpose other than family or household purposes),
c. installation, reinstallation, or antenna systems,
or
d. damage (including rust, corrosion or other product
failure) due to causes beyond Sears control such as
abuse, theft, fire, flood, wind, lightning, freezing,
power failure, power reduction, unusual atmospheric
conditions, etc.
3.
RENEWAL AND CANCELLATION.
You may renew this
Agreement at the end of each term unless parts are
likely to be unavailable.
You may cancel at any time
for any reason.
If you cancel this Agreement within
thirty (30) days of the date issued, we will refund the
full purchase price.
If you cancel this Agreement
after the first thirty (30) days, but before it expires,
we will refund for the remaining days of coverage on a
daily prorated basis.
If Sears is unable, to furnish
any parts required under this Agreement, we will cancel
the Agreement for that product and refund the full
purchase price of the coverage for that product for the
entire term.
4.

TIME FOR SERVICE.

Service will be done during
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maintenance agreements.

Maintenance agreements, once purchased,

can be renewed for periods of up to 10 years.

The original

maintenance agreement is generally sold as a two year or a three
year maintenance agreement at the point of purchase.

However,

in fact, the maintenance agreement is only intended to cover
repairs to the product after the time period covered by the
express warranty.

Thus, a two year maintenance agreement in

reality only covers repairs for one year, though it may cover
a few other matters such as customer instruct calls, preventive
maintenance checks, or correction of poor installations within
the period of the express warranty.

Likewise,

a three year

maintenance agreement in reality provides two years full coverage
for repairs after expiration of the one year generally applicable
express warranty.^5
The State has placed no particular focus on practices relating
to renewal of maintenance agreements once sold and, therefore,
the Court has not separately considered such renewals.

The

principal focus of the State's case is upon original sale of
maintenance agreements.
Maintenance agreements are

sold generally at four separate

l^The maintenance agreement contract specifies that: "Parts
and service already covered under any warranty will be provided
under that warranty." The training materials also indicate that
customers may be advised that express warranty work is performed
under the express warranty, not the maintenance agreement.
Further, as indicated above, a maintenance agreement does provide
some potential services during the warranty period.
Thus, the
Court determines that there is no unfair trade practice in
maintenance agreement sales which may cover the express warranty
period.

43

maintenance agreement sales.

Hundreds of pages of deposition

testimony and similar volumes of documentary evidence are devoted
to the Attorney General's exploration of Sears efforts and practices
to improve maintenance agreement sales.

Many of the questions

posed can be read in context to suggest that the questioner
views these efforts as involving some sinister motive.
making a profit,

even perhaps a significant one,

an unfair trade practice.
improve

Likewise,

But

is not yet

evidence of efforts to

sales of a product and to promote more

aggressive

salesmanship of a product does not demonstrate an unfair trade
practice.

The State suggests that the profit motive and the

heavy pressure which Sears places on its employees to improve
maintenance agreement sales will somehow create unfair selling
situations,

but there is virtually no evidence of such unfair

selling situations in reality occurring, absent a few suggested
sales statements in training materials which may or may not
have been used in practice in a way that created an unfair selling
situation.

Simply put, the Court finds the large volume of

evidence relating to Sears admitted efforts to promote sales of
maintenance agreements and to profit from such sales of virtually
no assistance to it in determining the issues in this case -whether unfair trade practices have been committed.
This case is not about whether a maintenance agreement
is a "good deal" or a "bad deal" for the consumer.

No statement

in this opinion should be viewed as suggesting any view of the
Court on that issue.

The sole issue addressed here is whether
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review of promotional results reports and other Sears documents
relating to product sales.
In any event, as the evidence relating to durability is
in conflict and efforts to achieve stipulations in this area
have failed, the Court, based on review of the evidence, makes
the following findings for the eleven major appliances at issue
in this case:
1.
—

A very high percentage of the eleven major appliances

eighty to ninety percent —

sold to consumers for private,

non-commercial use will be in operable condition

10

to

12

years

after the date of purchase, and a significant portion will continue
to operate 15 years after the date of purchase if the,.appliance
is .used_.,in, .reasonable, .compliance .with., the .instructipns..i;n..the
owner 1 s manual..
2.

Less than half —

.25 percent to 40 percent —

of the

eleven major appliances may require a service call or return to
the shop in the first three years after purchase to assure that
the appliance operates in accordance with its design purpose.
However, the reason for the vast majority of these service calls
or returns to the shop will be consumer instruct, consumer misuse,
or maintenance or preventive maintenance not related to failure
of operation.
This finding is based on Sears data and reports of experiences
by Sears maintenance personnel which focus on estimated comparisons
between numbers of sales and numbers of service or shop calls.
Since some appliances , particularly those receiving annual preventive
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5.

The significant changes which have occurred in the

basic products over the past few years are changes which, in
themselves,

also tend to improve durability.

These changes

principally relate to substitution of electronic for mechanical
controls on items such as televisions, washing machines, dryers
and ranges, and the substitution of solid state for tube and
transistor systems in televisions.

These newer systems are

less likely to break down than the systems they replace.

However,

when they do require repair, the repairs tend to be more expensive.
Another factor which has affected durability and has apparently
had a leveling effect on durability progressions, which would
otherwise increase due to maturing design, is the greater addition
of special features to the products.
such as ice makers in refrigerators,

These Special features,
separate power heads on

vacuum cleaners and new stitch systems in sewing machines tend
to increase the frequency of repair requirements for these products,
but do not drastically compromise the durability findings indicated
above.
7.

Microwave ovens have now been widely available on the

consumer market for approximately 10 years.

The available evidence

indicates that non-convection microwave ovens used for private,
noncommercial uses and maintained in reasonable compliance with
the owner's manual can be expected to operate for a period of
10 years or more for at least 7 5% of the products originally
purchased.
8.

Video cassette recorders have a lesser history of wide
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Based on the above specific findings,

the following more

general findings can be stated regarding the quality, reliability
and durability of Sears products.
First, most consumers purchasing one of the eleven major
appliances at issue in this portion of the case can reasonably
expect that the product should last at least

10

years if used

in reasonable compliance with the directions of the owner's
manual in private noncommercial use in a home setting that does
not result in the product being used by or for an unusually
large number of persons.
Second,

subject to the same conditions relating to use,

most products will not fail to operate due to failure of a component
of the product within the first three years or the first four
years after purchase.
Third,

in the first three or four years,

a significant

percentage of customers, but a minority of the total of purchasers,
<

will require a service call or consultation with Sears service
personnel because of their misuse of the product or because they
are not properly complying with instructions for the product and
need assistance and further instruction.

Maintenance .Agreements .and Implied.Warranties;
The principal focus of the Attorney General's attack on the
maintenance agreement sales program is the contention that customers
purchasing maintenance agreements get little or nothing for their
purchase that is not guaranteed them free under the State's

THE COURT:
So even if a consumer doesn't understand
the instructions, not just talking about Sears now,
we are talking about General Motors —
MR. BROWN:

Right.

THE COURT:
— and Montgomery Wards and Frank
Pomerleau's and everything else, if the consumer
doesn't understand the instructions, and as a
result of that, there's a product failure —
MR. BROWN:

Right.

THE COURT:

—

MR. BROWN:

Yes.

THE COURT :

For four years?

MR. BROWN:

The law is very clear —

THE COURT:

Is that right?

MR. BROWN:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BROWN:
to be

Yeah, right.

it's the seller's responsibility?
The law is very clear —

The law is very clear.
So I just want to understand this.
Reasonable.

I mean, it's got

People at Sears or Pomerleau's or Bob
THE COURT:
Chambers's Ford or anybody else, they better get
people that are absolute experts in communication
to be their salesmen because if the people don't
understand the directions and don't understand
the manuals they are given or at least come into
Court and allege they couldn't, that's enough to
shift responsibility for repairs to the seller,
right?
MR. BROWN:

Well —

THE COURT:

Correct?

MR. BROWN:
With a very important qualification, of
course, that that consumer has to be reasonable in
his misunderstanding. You have to use an objective
standard.
[several pages omitted]

53

MR. BROWN:
When you use the words guarantee,
absolute guarantee, of course you use the words
that Sears will be using —
THE COURT:

Tell me how I am mistaken?

MR. BROWN:

The implied warranty —

THE COURT:
Absent consumer abuse or consumer misuse,
you seem to be saying there is a guarantee. Tell me
how I am mistaken?
MR. BROWN:
There is a responsibility for defects.
The implied warranty —
THE COURT:
Okay. I will call it responsibility
rather than guarantee. I don't like guarantee,
either. Saying that result, they pay rather than
me when I go in to get the repair.
MR. BROWN:
The implied warranty is a mechanism,
an important — the most important consumer
mechanism that exists which allocates responsibility
for failures between the seller, when they are
defects, and the consumer, when the various misuse
and abuse or some other, a lightning bolt strikes,
that is a very important element. And if you fall
on the defect side, yes, you are responsible for
four years. And that's what the statute says and
that is what the case law says, and in this case
that's what the facts say.
The law relating to implied warranties is codified in the
Uniform Commercial Code at 11 M.R.S.A. § 2 - 3 1 4 . The key to §
1 6 §2 -3 1 4

.

implied warranty:

merchantability; usage of trade

(1) Unless excluded or modified by section 2-316, a warranty
that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of
that kind.
Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2)

Goods to be merchantable must at least be such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of
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In the State's view a "defect" is the basis for an implied
warranty claim. 18 Accordingly, with its definition of "merchantable"
and its proposed finding, Sears and other retailers in similar
positions would be responsible for repairs, under the implied
warranty, for any breakdowns or failures which occur in the first
four years after purchase of an appliance, absent abuse or misuse.
The Attorney General argues that with such an interpretation
"a consumer

does

'guarantee. '"19

not

secure,

by any means,

a four

year

But this statement is based on the view that a

guarantee does not exist unless consumers assert their rights
under it.

For consumers that do choose to assert their rights,

however, a four year guarantee, absent abuse or misuse, is exactly
what the Attorney General is urging.

Further, the combination of

the proposed definition of merchantable and the proposed finding,
both looking to the reasonable assumptions of consumers, effectively
shifts the burden of proof to sellers to disprove responsibility
for a defect once a breakdown has been demonstrated.
Adoption of such an approach to interpretation of seller
responsibility for repairs under § 2-314 would represent a
significant shift away from the assumptions under which many
sellers presently appear to be operating.

The Court must decide

whether this approach is a proper view of the law of implied
Instate's Post-Trial Brief pp. 3-6.
Instate's Post-Trial Brief at

6.
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cited by the State, International. _Pe.troleum „Service s .Inc,..v ,.„S&_M
Well...Seryi.cg.s_t... I n c 639 P.2d 29 (Kan. 1982) speaks of "normal
commercial expectations" hardly the standard urged upon the
Court.

The final quote cited by the Attorney General is not

even a holding of a court, just a court statement of what the
plaintiff was claiming in that particular case, Gootee,,v,....Colt
Industries, _ Inc.., 712 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6 th Cir. 1983) where the
plaintiff had shot himself with his own gun.
While the precedents cited by the Attorney General are off
the mark, one must not be too critical of their effort.

Research

that requires reading a significant number of appellate decisions
on "implied warranty" and "merchantability" issues quickly becomes
a frustrating experience, since the quoted terms are subject to a
wide variety of rhetorical formulations, though most are interpreting
statutes identical, or virtually identical,
2-314.'

to 11 M.R.S.A.

§

Within the vast body of appellate opinions on the issue,

the Court expects that a tenacious reader could discover quotes
to support virtually any position on implied warranties one
wanted to take.

However, what is also apparent is that the

language of each case is geared to the particular fact pattern of
that case, as in the case of the boy throwing the bottle against
the telephone pole.

Further, the large majority of cases appear

to have developed from'product liability -- personal injury
situations where the Appellate Court is reviewing trial court and
jury decisions made in a context where tort, product liability,
strict liability for dangerous condition, and damages issues have
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The definition in subsection 2 is not viewed as exclusive,
other attributes of merchantability may be demonstrated in particular
cases or for particular products.

Official Uniform Commercial

Code Comments to § 2-314, 16.
However, the implied warranty defined by § 2-314 is viewed
as a "minimal warranty" making it desirable for parties to specify
a higher standard of merchantability in their sales contract,
Anderson § 2-314:3.

In this context, "there is no duty to furnish

a product that will not wear out."

Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co..,

533 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1976); McLaughlin v. Sears Roebuck. & Co.,
281 A.2d 587, 589 (N.H. 1971); McNally v. Chrysler Motor Corp..,
284 N.Y.S.2d 761 (N.Y. 1967).

And, in fact, buyers are not even

viewed as being guaranteed a break in period that is completely
free of mechanical failure or requirements for service, Anderson
§ 2-314:30.

"The fact that the product is not perfect and breaks

down does not in itself establish that there was a breach of the
warranty of merchantability."

Id.

Existence of a defect or a

failure to meet a standard at time of sale must be proven, Mullen
y,-_Gener_al_Mptors Corp. , 336 N.E.2d 338 (111. App. 1975).
Most significant for this case, § 2-314 is not viewed as
requiring a seller to furnish goods and in effect guarantee
replacement of all parts that may break or wear out.

"The fact that minor repairs are required is generally
not regarded as establishing that there was a breach of
warranty.
This in effect is making a quantitative
measurement:
the minor repair does not establish that
goods were nonconforming; a major repair does.
The
question of fact then arises as to whether a particular
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to be the first to do so.
In the Court's view, the implied warranty imposed by statute
is a warranty by the seller of the product that a product, at the
time of sale, is relatively safe to use and fit for the purposes
for which it was intended and free from major defects that will
cause failure of operation.

Implied warranties are not limited

to any particular duration.
A number of factors can be cited to determine when and for
how long a retailer or a manufacturer may have responsibility for
repair or replacement of a product under the law of implied
warranties :
—

The seriousness of the defect.

—

The cost for repair of the defect in relation to the cost

of the product.
—

The extent to which the defect could or should have been

discovered in the manufacturing process.
—

The time of discovery of the defect in relation to sale

of the product.
-- The precision or imprecision that was reasonably to be
expected in manufacture of the product.
-- The extent to which the defect is either common or
exceptional to the particular product.
—

The extent to which the defect could or could not be wear

related.
— The extent to which consumer use contributed to manifestation
of the defect.
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could be revised without offending Article I, § 10 (the contracts
i

clause) of the United States Constitution, consumers might gain a
significant short term benefit, although the economic ramifications
of such a rule, in the long term, would be difficult to determine.
But, with the available limited legislation relating to unfair trade
practices and implied warranties, imposition of such a significant
restructuring of business relationships is not this Court's
prerogative.
Thus, the State has failed to demonstrate that Sears misleads
customers when it sells maintenance agreements by making them
believe that they must purchase,

either through maintenance

agreements or through prospective repair costs, what the law
gives them for free.
Maine law provides no such free repair service. On examination,
it may well be that some repairs covered by maintenance agreements
would qualify for coverage under implied warranties.

Thus, the

possibility of implied responsibility cannot be denied,
telephone solicitation discussion,
evidence —

infra.

see

But the available

particularly the South Portland service records —

suggest that most repairs or service calls for maintenance agreements
in the second, third and subsequent years of products lives fall
outside this category.

Instead, they would appear to be more

properly characterized as service calls to instruct customers, to
provide instruction or do repairs occasioned by misuse, to repair
wear related failures, and to repair minor product or part failures
that fall within the normal range of commercial expectations for
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Main tenance ..Agreement,,Sa les. Durability ..Issue s_:
There is a large volume of evidence^ relating to what customers
are told in the course of efforts by Sears sales persons to sell
maintenance agreements and what the sales persons are in turn
advised to tell customers during the course of their training
relating to sale of maintenance agreements.
In light of the Court's findings

relating to quality,

reliability, and durability of the eleven products, some of the
statements which Sears suggests in training materials for sales
people to communicate to customers are troubling.

To meet some

maintenance agreements sales "objections" by customers favorably
impressed with past performance of Sears products, Sears employees
are advised in training materials to suggest that new products
are more complicated and more likely to require attention than
past products.

The evidence relating to durability does not

support such suggestions.

The statements may not be false, in

light of the fact that most new products, replacing older products,
also have more features which in fact require some attention and
perhaps increase repair requirements.

However, the evidence is

undisputed that identical products, with identical features, are
more durable today, than in the past, at least if the available
21 -The evidence consists primarily of written and video-tape
training materials and some statements by Sears management level
employees. There is insufficient evidence of maintenance agreement
sales pitches in consumer depositions to base any findings on
such statements.
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Maintenance, Agreements.Telephone .Sales.;
It may be another matter, however, when the same consumer,
having spent hundreds of dollars for a particular product, suddenly
receives a telephone call from the store demeaning the reliability
of the product and suggesting that the consumer, at that point,
best purchase a maintenance agreement or "repair insurance"
to avoid the high cost of repairs that may otherwise befall
him.

Once people buy a product,

they develop a defensive

psychological interest in justifying their decision which makes
them want to protect their investment.
As one of America's greatest salesmen has observed:
"Remember this: Anybody who ever buys anything
— a house, a car, or stocks and bonds —
will rationalize his purchase for a few
weeks, even if he made a mistake."
Lee Iacocca, Iacocea,,,An,Autobiography, (1984) pp. 33-34.
The same certainly can be said of a purchaser of a $1000 refrigerator
or a $700 television.
buy,

A follow-up call 30 days after the big

suggesting potential reliability problems and urging a

maintenance agreement to defend against high repair costs, will
meet a particularly susceptible and receptive listener.
In critical areas, the training materials for store sales
personnel and the training materials
representatives

differ significantly.

for

telephone

sales

The telephone sales

training materials appear to place more emphasis on risks of high
repair costs without maintenance agreements.

Similarly, the
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related to major appliances, is in direct violation of a Federal
Trade Commission Order, Sears Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406 (1980),
affirmed Sears Roebuck & Co. v. F.T.C. , 676 F.2d 385 (1st Cir.
1982).

This order bars Sears from making statements in connection

with sales of major home appliances which are untrue and which,
if they relate to appliance performance, cannot be supported by
competent, reliable tests or other evidence.
The 1980 Federal Trade Commission Order requires, in pertinent
part :
I.
It Is Ordered, That for purposes of this order the
following definitions shall apply:
1. "Major home appliance" means air conditioning units
(room or built-in), clothes washers, clothes dryers,
disposers, dishwashers, trash compactors, refrigerators,
refrigerator/freezers, ranges, stoves, ovens (including
microwave ovens), humidifiers, and dehumidifiers.
2. "Competent and reliable test" means a test in which
persons with skill and expert knowledge in the field to
which the test pertains conduct the test and evaluate
its results in an objective manner, using test procedures
that insure accurate and reliable results. Such tests
must be truly and fully representative of expectable
consumer usage.
II.
[relates only to dishwashers and is not
relevant here]
III.
It Is Further Ordered, That Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
.. . in connection with the advertising, offering for
sale, or sale or distribution of "major home appliances,"
in or affecting commerce ... do forthwith cease and
desist from:
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Such records shall be retained by Sears, Roebuck and
Co. for a period of three years from the date such
advertising, sales materials, promotional materials, or
post purchase materials were last disseminated ....
95 F.T.C. at 524-527.
Taking advantage of a consumer who has made a big purchase
by a phone call after the sale,

urging upon the consumer a

maintenance agreement by usé of a sales pitch which may contain
false statements violative of an FTC order, suggesting that he
has bought a less reliable product than in fact he has bought,
amounts to an unfair trade practice using false or inaccurate
statements to induce the consumer to buy the product, in this
case the maintenance agreement.
The statements relating to repair frequency in the training
materials for telephone solicitors are false or inaccurate;
because they cannot be documented and are used in connection with
sales related to major appliances,
F.T.C.

they violate an existing

order; they are likely, and are intended to be used to

mislead consumers under the circumstances; and the representations
are rather evidently material to the purchasing decision the
solicitor seeks to invoke.

As such, the statements constitute an

unfair and deceptive trade practice, violative of 5 M.R.S.A. §
207, Cliffdale Associates, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 9156, 3 Trade REg.
Rep. 5 22,137 (1984); State ex rel Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436
A.2d 866, 874 (Me. 1981).

y
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in excess of $25.00.23
of either the seller —

Additionally, they do not bear the signature
Sears —

or the consumer.

The Consumer Solicitation Sales Act, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4662,
requires that such telephone solicited contracts "be in writing,
bear the signature of the seller and the consumer ..." and meet
other requirements not in issue in this action.

Rather evidently,

Sears telephone solicitation sales of maintenance agreements
fails to meet the signature requirements.
Sears urges that its sales are exempt from the Act because
the consumer, by initiating the appliance sale also initiated the
contact with Sears leading to the maintenance agreement solicitation.
That argument only suggests that Sears is indeed reaching for
straws on the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act issue.
Sears also argues that even if there is technical non-compliance
with such requirements, the failure of compliance is deminimis,
particularly since all purchasers of maintenance agreements
have the right to terminate the maintenance agreement for a
full refund of money, or with no charge within 30 days after
the sale.

This, Sears urges, compares favorably with the ability

to avoid the contract only within 3 days provided by 32 M.R.S.A.
§ 4664.

However, it is difficult to view a practice which results

in such a large number of sales out of compliance with the Consumer
Solicitation Sales Act as a deminimis problem.
Sears may not like the policies behind the Consumer Solicitation
23sales under $25.00 are exempt, 32 M.R.S.A. § 4668.
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curable defect.

Second, telephone solicitation is commercial

speech, entitled like other speech to special caution in injunctive
regulation under the First Amendment of

the United

States

Constitution and art. I, § 4 of the Maine Constitution, Equifax
Se rvices,_ Inc,,._ v .Cohen_, 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980).

The defects in

telephone solicitation of sales of maintenance agreements of
concern in these proceedings appear remediable by a change in the
nature of the maintenance agreement telephone sales contract
process and by retraining of telephone sales representatives to
assure that their presentations do not include misstatements and
undocumentable statements regarding Sears products.

Rather than

trying to fashion a remedy itself, however, the Court believes
that this should be left in the first instance to Sears.
Accordingly, the Court will give Sears 45 days to produce
for Court consideration and approval a plan to assure that its
Maine telephone solicitation sales of maintenance agreements are
in compliance with the Consumer Solicitation Sales Act and to
indicate how telephone sales representatives will be retrained
with respect to their statements regarding Sears products.

The

plan should include further provisions to assure that it will be
implemented within 90 days after the plan receives Court approval.
If a reasonable good faith plan is presented within 45 days, no
injunction will issue pending Court consideration of the plan.
In light of the resolution of issues under state law in this
case, the Court need not address the questions of preemption by
federal law or federal orders raised by Sears in the course of
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2.

On all other counts and claims, judgment for Defendant

Sears, Roebuck & Company that the State is not entitled to the
relief sought by the Amended Complaint.
3.

Consideration of the question of attorney's fees is

deferred to further hearing which will be scheduled shortly.

Dated:

August

9
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t

COMPLAINT
1. This is a civil action brought by the Department of Attorney General
pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 205-A - 214, the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, to
restrain defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co., including its subsidiary Western Auto
Supply Company (collectively referred to as "Sears"), from engaging in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices relating to bankruptcy debt collection, including unfair
and deceptive acts and practices in connection with obtaining reaffirmation
agreements from Chapter 7 debtors. The State also seeks civil penalties, restitution
for consumers, and the costs of its investigation and litigation of this matter,
including reasonable attorney fees.
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action lies with this Court
pursuant to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 205-A -214, Maine's
Constitution and common law. Venue is proper in this Court under 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 209.

A TRUE COPY

THE PARTIES
3. The plaintiff is the State of Maine, represented by the Attorney General,
who brings this action in the public interest pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
4. The Defendant is Sears, Roebuck and Co.("Sears")/ a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York, including its subsidiary Western Auto
Supply Company ("Western Auto"). Sears is engaged in the consumer retail
business and transacts commerce from its many stores and establishments located
throughout the State. Western Auto engages in the business of supplying
automotive parts and services.
FACTS
5. Sears sells a variety of consumer goods, including appliances, clothing,
electronic goods, hardware, and toys, to consumers via a network of retail stores.
Consumers may purchase Sears goods and services using credit products offered by
Sears. The credit extended is typically open-end and includes finance charges. In
most cases, the credit is accessed via a Sears credit card.
6. Many consumers who purchased goods from Sears have been unable to
pay their debts to creditors generally, including debts to Sears incurred through the
use of Sears credit cards, and have sought protection by filing for bankruptcy in the
federal bankruptcy court.
7. In an effort to continue collections on credit card debt incurred by
consumers who have declared bankruptcy, Sears has importuned such debtors to
reaffirm their credit card debt that would otherwise be discharged through
bankruptcy.
8. Upon obtaining the consumers' agreement to reaffirm their debt to Sears,
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Sears unlawfully failed to file or ensure the filing of the reaffirmation agreement
and/or unlawfully failed to obtain the approval of the bankruptcy court prior to
continuing to collect on the debt reaffirmed by the consumer.
9. After obtaining the reaffirmation agreements and failing to file such
agreements with the bankruptcy court, Sears represented or continued to represent
that the reaffirmation agreements were enforceable, including under Sears' rights
and remedies contained in the Sears credit card agreement. Sears continued to
demand payments from consumers in connection with reaffirmation agreements
not filed with court, and in many instances charged these consumers interest, late
fees, and penalties during the collection processes, and/or caused inaccurate and
damaging entries to be made on the credit reports of these consumers if they failed
to pay the debt covered by these invalid reaffirmation agreements.
10. Sears undertook these practices despite its knowledge that the postbankruptcy collection of its credit card debts under these circumstances was
unlawful. Western Auto has engaged in similar practices to those of Sears alleged
above, including the failure to file reaffirmation agreements with the bankruptcy
courts.
CAUSES OF ACTION
11. The State re-alleges all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and
incorporates them herein.
12. Defendant has violated 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 by engaging in various unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, including, but not limited to:
a)

making deceptive or misleading statements to consumers in order to

obtain consumers' agreement to reaffirm their debt to Sears in the course of the
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consumers' Chapter 7 proceedings;
b) misleading consumers regarding the consequences of a refusal to
reaffirm debts during the course of their bankruptcy,
c) inducing consumers to reaffirm debts to Sears in violation of
Bankruptcy Code requirements for reaffirmation agreements;
d) failing to file, or failing to ensure the filing of, reaffirmation
agreements with the Bankruptcy Court as required by law;
e) misrepresenting to debtors that they are legally responsible to repay
debts that have been reaffirmed in an improper manner;
f) collecting or attempting to collect from consumers debts that have been
discharged in bankruptcy;
g) continuing to charge additional interest and finance charges on
consumer debts that Sears knew or should have known it had no right to collect;
and
h) falsely reporting to credit agencies that consumers have failed to pay
lawful debts when in fact Sears knew that such debts had been discharged in
bankruptcy.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that this Court:
a)

issue an injunction permanently barring the defendant from (i)

soliciting or obtaining from consumers, during bankruptcy proceedings, agreements
to reaffirm debt without complying with the Bankruptcy Code, (ii) collecting or
seeking to collect on any previously reaffirmed debts from consumers where the
purported reaffirmation agreement did not satisfy the requirements of the
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Bankruptcy Code, (iii) misleading debtors regarding the consequences of their failure
to reaffirm their debt to Sears or the effect of reaffirmation agreements obtained by
Sears, and (iv) misleading consumers regarding their rights and/or obligations as
debtors under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code;
b) order defendant to pay the Department of Attorney General a civil
penalty in the amount of $5,000.00 for each intentional violation of 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 207 found by the Court;
c) order defendant to pay full restitution to all consumers harmed by each
aforementioned violation;
d) order defendant to pay the Department of Attorney General its
investigative and litigation costs in this matter, including reasonable attorney fees;
and
e) grant such other relief as the court deems equitable and just.
Respectfully Submitted,
DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

ANDREW KETTERER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Dated:
JAMES A. MCKENNA
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
Six State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Tel. No.: (207) 626-8800
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FINAL CONSENT TUDGMENT CL"rl/ OF COURTS
It appearing to the Court that defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co., including its
subsidiary, Western Auto Supply Company ("Western Auto") (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Sears"), without admitting liability, has consented in the
Consent attached hereto, to the entry of this Consent Judgment, and the Court
finding both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and the Attorney General
having determined that this Consent Judgment including the restitution provisions
is a fair and equitable resolution of the Complaint, IT IS HEREBY AGREED,
ORDERED, AND ADJUDGED THAT:
RESTITUTION ARY RELIEF
1. For purposes of this Judgment, the term "Affected Consumer" shall mean
each individual who (i) filed a petition for relief under the United States Bankruptcy
Code, (ii) listed Sears as a creditor, against whom Sears filed a claim, or who owed a
debt or alleged debt to Sears, (iii) entered into an agreement purporting to reaffirm a
debt owed to Sears, and (iv) where such agreement was not filed with the
bankruptcy court prior to the order of discharge, or was filed with the bankruptcy
ATRUE COPY
■•TEST:
Deajarcfin
îïiirk of Court«

court and was either (A) disapproved or rejected by the bankruptcy court or not
approved by such court when necessary to result in the enforceability of such
agreement, or (B) rescinded by the debtor within the time provided by the
Bankruptcy Code. For each Affected Consumer identified pursuant to paragraph 2
herein, Sears shall:
a) relinquish any claim to any unpaid portion of the reaffirmed debt and
adjust the Affected Consumer's account balance to reflect the relinquishment of the
claim;
b) return to the Affected Consumer any monies paid on account of the
reaffirmed debt, and any monies paid in finance charges on account of such debt
until the date compensation under this paragraph is paid;
c) reimburse the Affected Consumer for the lost time-value of the money
paid, by providing the Affected Consumer with interest on the aforementioned sum
at a rate of 10% per annum, for the full period for which said monies were held by
Sears;
d) not charge finance charges on new purchases, if any, made by such
Affected Consumer between the date of the Affected Consumer's petition for
bankruptcy and the date the account balance is adjusted in accordance with
paragraph 1(a) and credit the Affected Consumer's account with the amount of any
finance charges previously charged on purchases made after the Affected
Consumer's petition for bankruptcy; and, further,
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e)

waive any security interest which Sears claimed in merchandise

purchased by such Affected Consumer prior to the date he or she filed a petition for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code ("pre-bankruptcy merchandise") and not seek to
recover any such pre-bankruptcy merchandise.
2. (A)

Sears shall use its reasonable best efforts to affirmatively identify,

and provide the restitutionary relief set forth in paragraph 1 to, every Affected
Consumer who filed a chapter 7 petition from January 1, 1992 through April 1, 1997,
except for Affected Consumers of Western Auto. In so doing, Sears shall identify as
such an Affected Consumer all persons who both owed a debt to Sears (or whom
Sears claimed owed a debt) and filed for bankruptcy from January 1, 1992 through
April 1, 1997 whose Sears account records indicate the existence of a reaffirmation
agreement even if no original or copy of the reaffirmation agreement is located,
absent contrary direct evidence that the reaffirmation agreement was filed with the
bankruptcy court and not thereafter disapproved, rejected or rescinded. In the event
that Sears is unable to determine from evidence available to it whether a person's
reaffirmation agreement was filed, Sears shall assume that the reaffirmation was
not filed and identify such person as such an Affected Consumer. Sears shall not
treat as filed any reaffirmation agreement unless either (i) Sears has a physical copy
that is stamped with a court stamp reflecting its filing; or (ii) a review of either the
actual court records or an electronic docket search conducted via PACER (or similar
database) reflects that the reaffirmation agreement was filed and does not indicate its
disapproval or rejection by the court.
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*

(B)

The payments to Affected Consumers identified pursuant to

paragraph 2(A) shall be calculated and paid by Sears, subject to review by an
independent settlement administrator ("the Settlement Administrator"). The
Settlement Administrator shall be retained at Sears expense and shall be selected by
Sears, subject to the approval of the Massachusetts Attorney General after
consultation with Maine and other States' Attorneys General, i In order to facilitate
the Settlement Administrator's review of Sears payments to Affected Consumers
identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A), Sears shall make available to the Settlement
Administrator all documents, persons, and other information reasonably necessary
to review Sears processes for payment to those Affected Consumers identified
pursuant to paragraph 2(A). The Settlement Administrator's review of Sears
calculation of payments to Affected Consumers shall include testing of a statistically
reliable sample of accounts identified by Sears as Affected Consumers to verify that
the amounts calculated by Sears as owed to such Affected Consumers pursuant to
the processes described in the Written Summary (described in paragraph 7.a. herein)
were calculated in accordance with paragraphs 1-4 herein. The Settlement
Administrator, within a reasonable time (not to exceed thirty days) following the
date that all payments must be made to Affected Consumers pursuant to paragraph
8 herein, shall provide to the Attorneys General Compliance Committee (described
in paragraph 6 herein) a written report, based upon such review, that certifies that

1 F o r p u r p o s e s o f t h i s J u d g m e n t , t h e r e f e r e n c e s t o S t a t e s A t t o r n e y s G e n e r a l a s it p e r t a i n s t o
H a w a i i , refers to th e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r o f the H a w a i i Of f i c e o f th e C o n s u m e r Protection.
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t)

.

Sears has properly calculated the amounts payable to Affected Consumers in
accordance with paragraphs 1-4 of this Judgment and that such amounts have
actually been paid to Affected Consumers.
(C)

In the event that Sears payments under paragraphs 1(b) and (c) to

Affected Consumers identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A) total less than
$100,000,000 when completed, Sears shall pay the difference between $100,000,000
and the amount actually paid pursuant to such paragraphs to the State Attorneys
General, to be divided among the States in the same proportion as the number of
Affected Consumers in each state identified under paragraph 2(A) bears to the total
number of Affected Consumers, to be used for consumer protection purposes,
including but not limited to, consumer education, credit or bankruptcy counseling
and education, and conflict resolution programs. Such payment to the States
Attorneys General, if any, shall be made not later than 30 days after the date
payments to Affected Consumers identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A) are
complete. In the event that, at the time of such payment under this paragraph 2(C),
a Consent Judgment between a State and Sears has not been entered, then the
payment hereunder shall be divided among those States where a Consent Judgment
with Sears has been entered, in the same proportion as the number of Affected
Consumers in each such State bears to the total number of Affected Consumers in
such states.
3.

Affected Consumers who filed a bankruptcy petition prior to January 1,

1992, and Affected Consumers who filed a bankruptcy petition after January 1, 1992
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that Sears is unable to identify pursuant to paragraph 2(A) herein, and Affected
Consumers of Western Auto also shall be entitled to the restitutionary relief
described in paragraph 1, as provided in this paragraph. Payments to such Affected
Consumers under this paragraph shall be made under the supervision of the
Settlement Administrator, who shall require persons who may be such Affected
Consumers to file a proof of claim. In order to facilitate notice to such persons of the
restitutionary relief provided herein and the proof of claim process, Sears shall
publish notice in a national newspaper and in 24 major metropolitan newspapers,
and provide notice to active Sears credit card customers via inserts into billing
statements. On or before October 8, 1997, such an Affected Consumer must file a
properly completed proof of claim with the Settlement Administrator and provide
appropriate documentation of his or her bankruptcy, reaffirmation agreement, and
some payment thereon, to be eligible for restitution under this paragraph. Sears
shall provide clear and conspicuous instructions with the proof of claim form to
explain how the proof of claim is to be completed properly, what type of appropriate
documentation is required (and basic instructions as to how to obtain those
documents), and when the deadline is for submission of the proof of claim form
and appropriate documentation. Appropriate documentation means the following:
(A) evidence of a chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge (for example, a copy of an order of
discharge); (B) either (i) evidence of a reaffirmation agreement (for example, a copy
of the reaffirmation agreement, or a post-petition Sears account statement or
correspondence referencing a reaffirmation agreement) or (ii) evidence of a pre-
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bankruptcy petition debt to Sears listed or treated in such bankruptcy (for example, a
bankruptcy schedule listing Sears as a creditor, or correspondence indicating the
existence of a pre-bankruptcy petition debt) coupled with evidence of some post
bankruptcy petition payment to Sears (for example, a canceled check, money order
payment stub, Sears account statement reflecting a payment credit, or
correspondence with Sears referencing such payment). Appropriate documentation
shall also include, for each category, such documents and/or combinations of
documents as the Settlement Administrator shall reasonably determine to be
sufficient to satisfy the above requirements, for instance, by taking into account the
claimant's stated inability to obtain the documents, and in circumstances where a
claimant notifies the Settlement Administrator that he or she is unable to locate or
obtain the evidence of a pre-petition debt to Sears listed or treated in such
bankruptcy described above, the Settlement Administrator shall reasonably
determine whether that documentation requirement is satisfied by certain account
statements or credit charge receipts close in time to the claimant's bankruptcy
petition. If a proof of claim received by the Settlement Administrator is not
properly completed or accompanied by the required documentation, the Settlement
Administrator (at Sears expense) shall send a notification to the claimant describing
the deficiency, stating that the deficiency may be corrected within 30 days of the date
of the deficiency notification (or by October 8, 1997, if later), and, if applicable,
providing basic instructions as-to how required documentation may be obtained.
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If an eligible person provides to the Settlement Administrator documentaryinformation to show that such person reaffirmed a debt to Sears after filing
bankruptcy and to show the amount of payments made to Sears on account of his or
her reaffirmed debt, such person shall be treated as an Affected Consumer and paid
compensation in the same manner as is described in paragraph 1 herein. If such
person does not supply such documentation, Sears shall use its reasonable best
efforts to obtain the necessary information from its records, and if such information
is obtained, such person shall be treated as an Affected Consumer and paid
compensation in the same manner as is described in paragraph 1 herein. If a person
provides information to the Settlement Administrator indicating that he or she
reaffirmed a debt to Sears, but neither such person nor Sears can provide to the
Settlement Administrator information sufficient to show the amount of payments
made to Sears on account of the reaffirmed debt, then such person shall be paid an
amount calculated to be the same percentage of that person's reaffirmed
indebtedness (or pre-petition indebtedness, if the amount of reaffirmed
indebtedness has not been established) as the average percentage of reaffirmed
indebtedness (or pre-petition indebtedness, as the case may be) that Sears provides as
compensation to Affected Consumers who filed bankruptcy between January 1, 1992
and April 1, 1997, pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and 2 herein.
4.

Sears also shall make an additional payment of $25 million dollars, to be

divided pro rata among all Affected Consumers based upon the amount of
compensation paid to each Affected Consumer by Sears in accordance with
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paragraphs 1(b) and 3 (not taking into account any money payable under paragraph
1(c)), under the supervision and direction of the Settlement Administrator.
5. If any payment to an Affected Consumer is returned undeliverable, Sears
shall take or cause to be taken reasonable steps, including skip-tracing, to locate the
Affected Consumer. If, thereafter, the Affected Consumer is still not located (or an
Affected Consumer's check is not cashed within six months), any funds payable
under paragraphs 1-4 herein but not deliverable shall, pursuant to this judgment, be
paid to the Attorney General of the state of the last known address of such Affected
Consumer, as determined by the Settlement Administrator. Undeliverable funds
payable to Affected Consumers whose last known addresses are in Maine will be
applied by the Maine Attorney General for consumer protection purposes, or for
other purposes as required by law. If any unclaimed payments fall within the
requirements of the Maine Unclaimed Property Act, 33 M.R.S.A. c. 37, then their
disposition will be in accordance with that chapter.
6. (A)

Within six (6) months of entry of this Order, Sears shall provide to

the Maine Attorney General an initial report containing the following information
(to the extent such information is available at that time):
1)

A certification, if applicable, that all restitutionary relief provided for

herein due to all eligible Affected Consumers in Maine has been paid. The report
shall also verify and certify compliance with each provision of this Order related to
restitutionary relief.
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2)

The name and address of every Affected Consumer, as defined herein,

residing in Maine, together with the total amount of compensation paid to such
Affected Consumer under paragraphs 1-4 herein.
Such report shall be supplemented at quarterly intervals thereafter until such
time as Sears certifies, in a final report (hereinafter "Final Certification Report"),
that its identification of Affected Consumers pursuant to paragraph 2 is complete,
that the Settlement Administrator has completed the processing of all timely filed
proofs of claim, and that Sears has provided all restitutionary relief due to Affected
Consumers in Maine under this Judgment.
(B)

Sears shall provide for review by the Maine Attorney General,

within 30 days of written request, all records, documents and personnel reasonably
necessary to ascertain Sears compliance with the restitutionary provisions of this
Judgment as to Affected Consumers in Maine (for example, in response to inquiries
concerning specific Affected Consumers in Maine).
(C)

Sears shall make available, at its own expense, all records,

documents, and personnel reasonably necessary to assist the Settlement
Administrator in the performance of its duties under this judgment. Sears shall
require that the Settlement Administrator provide to the Maine Attorney General,
at Sears expense, within 30 days of written request, copies of records, documents and
reports (other than those already produced by Sears), reasonably necessary to
ascertain the performance of the Settlement Administrator's obligations under this
Judgment as to Affected Consumers in Maine. Further, Sears shall provide to the

Maine Attorney General a copy of all reports prepared by the Settlement
Administrator upon completion of such reports.
(D)

Nothing in this paragraph shall limit the Maine Attorney General's

rights to request or obtain information from Sears as otherwise provided in this
Judgment or as provided by law.
(E)

Sears shall also provide to each member of the Attorneys General

Compliance Committee comprised of representatives of the Attorneys General of
Massachusetts, California, Tennessee, Florida and Illinois (the "Compliance
Committee"), one copy of each report provided to the States Attorneys General
described in paragraph 6(A) herein. Until twelve months after the date Sears
provides to each member of the Compliance Committee the Final Certification
Report, Sears shall:
1) provide for review by the Compliance Committee, at Sears expense,
within 30 days of written request, all records, documents and personnel reasonably
necessary to ascertain Sears compliance with the restitutionary provisions of this
Judgment; and
2) require that the Settlement Administrator provide to the
Compliance Committee, at Sears expense, within 30 days of written request, copies
of records and documents (other than those already produced by Sears), and
personnel reasonably necessary to ascertain compliance with the restitutionary
provisions of this Judgment by Sears and the Settlement Administrator.

7.

a. Sears, at its sole expense, not later than the date that all payments

must be made to Affected Consumers pursuant to paragraph 8 herein, shall provide
to the Attorneys General Compliance Committee, as defined above, a written
summary (the "Written Summary") describing the process Sears used (i) to identify
Affected Consumers as required by paragraph 2(A) herein and to locate records of
people filing proofs of claim as described by paragraph 3 herein; (ii) to calculate the
amounts owed to Affected Consumers; and (iii) to actually pay those amounts to
Affected Consumers, which process has been undertaken pursuant to a Stipulated
Order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dated April
21, 1997, in United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
b.

Sears, at its sole expense, shall employ a nationally recognized firm

of public accountants to do all of the following:
(i) Perform procedures including inspecting documents and testing
records to determine that, to the best of their knowledge and as a result of having
performed those procedures, the methods described in the Written Summary were
followed by Sears to identify Affected Consumers and to locate records of people
filing proofs of claim as described in paragraph 3;
(ii) Conduct testing, using procedures agreed upon by Sears and the
Attorney General Compliance Committee, of a statistically reliable sample of
accounts identified by Sears as containing a reaffirmation but where such account
was not characterized as that of an Affected Consumer, to determine that such

accounts were so characterized correctly using the process described in the Written
Summary;
(iii) Within a reasonable time (but not more than 30 days) after the date
that all payments must be made to Affected Consumers pursuant to paragraph 8
herein, report to each member of the Attorneys General Compliance Committee on
the results of the procedures performed and testing conducted as described in
subsections 7(b)(i)-(ii) above.
(iv) Provide to the Attorneys General Compliance Committee, within
30 days of written request, and without claim of any privilege (except for the
accounting firm's attorney-client privilege), copies of all records, documents, reports,
and work papers obtained or prepared in connection with the duties set forth in this
paragraph, and to make available to the Attorneys General Compliance Committee
a person or persons familiar with the procedures to be performed pursuant to this
paragraph and with Sears methods for compliance with the restitutionary
provisions of this Judgment. If documents responsive to such a request already
have been produced to the Compliance Committee by Sears pursuant to paragraph 6
herein, the accounting firm may identify responsive documents previously
produced in lieu of providing duplicative copies.
c.

Not later than December 15, 1997, at Sears sole expense,

representatives of Sears and the accounting firm employed pursuant to paragraph
7(b) shall meet with the Attorneys General Compliance Committee in Boston,
Massachusetts, or such other location agreed upon in writing between Sears and the

Compliance Committee, in order to provide a status report, and answer questions,
concerning the accounting firm's procedures and testing of a sample of Sears
accounts as described in paragraph 7(b) herein. Thereafter, on or about the date that
the accounting firm provides to the Compliance Committee the report described in
paragraph 7(b)(iii), Sears and such accounting firm shall again so meet (in Boston,
Massachusetts or as agreed) in order to present, and answer questions concerning,
the accounting firm's report.
d.

Nothing herein shall limit the Attorneys General Compliance

Committee's ability to seek (nor Sears ability to object to) the judicial appointment of
an independent national accounting firm to audit, at Sears' expense, Sears
compliance with the restitutionary provisions of this judgment in the event that
the accounting firm employed by Sears fails to perform any of its required functions
under this paragraph.
8.

Except for pending disputed claims, all payments by Sears to Affected

Consumers provided for by paragraphs 1-4 herein shall be made not later than
January 15, 1998, or such later date as may be established by the proceedings in Brioso
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., et al., United States Bankruptcy Court, District of
Massachusetts, Eastern Division, Adversary Proceeding No. 97-1222-CJK or Conley
v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., et al., United States District Court, District of
Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 97-11149-PBS, but in no event later than January l,
1999, without further order of this Court. This obligation and Sears restitution
obligations hereunder shall not apply as to any person who does not relinquish all

claims that the person may have against Sears based on Sears obtaining or collecting
upon a reaffirmation agreement from that person in violation of law.
TNTIJNCTIVE RELIEF
9. For purpose of paragraphs 10-23, the following terms have the meanings
set forth below:
(A)

"Sears" means Sears, Roebuck and Co., including its subsidiary

Western Auto, and their employees, officers, directors, agents, and representatives;
their successors and assigns; and any person with actual or constructive knowledge
of this judgment who acts in concert with any of them.
(B) "Sears customer" means any person who owes, owed, or whom Sears
contends or claims to owe, any obligation to Sears, Roebuck and Co. and/or Western
Auto, as the case may be, in connection with any extension of credit made by Sears,
Roebuck and Co. and/or Western Auto, as the case may be, under a credit
agreement.
(C) "Bankruptcy Code" means the United States Bankruptcy Code, Title 11,
United States Code.
(D) "Reaffirmation Agreement" means the agreement referred to in
Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Sears is permanently enjoined and restrained
from engaging in any of the following:
10. Attempting to solicit or soliciting any Sears customer who is a debtor in a
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code to enter into an agreement to reaffirm debt

without giving the debtor and, if represented by counsel, the debtor's attorney, a
statement written in plain English, in at least 12-point type, containing the
following information:
A. The Sears customer is not required to reaffirm any debt;
B. If the Sears customer reaffirms any debt, the amount of the debt
reaffirmed will be subject to the same finance charge that is applied to outstanding
balances under the credit agreement, or, at Sears option, a lower finance charge
disclosed by Sears.
C. If the Sears customer reaffirms any debt, the reaffirmation
agreement will be filed with the bankruptcy court. Sears will provide the Sears
customer, and, if represented by counsel, the Sears customer's attorney, with a
bankruptcy court time stamped copy of the reaffirmation agreement. If the signed
reaffirmation agreement could not be timely filed, Sears will return the original
reaffirmation agreement, or, if the original was filed with the bankruptcy court, a
time stamped copy thereof, to the Sears customer or, if represented by counsel, to his
or her attorney, and the reaffirmation agreement will be void and of no effect.
D. The Sears customer may rescind the reaffirmation agreement before
the Sears customer's discharge or within 60 days of the filing of the reaffirmation
agreement with the bankruptcy court, whichever is later.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Sears makes such solicitation through the
debtor's attorney and not the debtor, Sears shall provide the statement described
above to debtor's attorney and request that such statement be given to the debtor;

provided, however, that if at any point thereafter Sears solicits the debtor directly,
Sears shall then provide the statement described above to the debtor.
11. Making any untrue or misleading statement to any Sears customer about
the rights, obligations, benefits, or consequences to the Sears customer of not
reaffirming all or any portion of the debt that Sears or the Sears customer contends
is owed or may be owed to Sears.
12. Soliciting, obtaining, or enforcing any agreement from a Sears customer to
reaffirm debt in violation of any provision of the Bankruptcy Code, including,
without limitation, Sections 362(a)(6); 524(a)(2), (c), and (d); and 727(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
13. Collecting or attempting to collect any debt (including any interest, fee,
charge, or expenses incidental to the principal obligation) in violation of the
Bankruptcy Code, including, without limitation, a debt that has been legally
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.
14. Failing to file all reaffirmation agreements it obtains from debtors
pursuant to Sections 524(c) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code with the appropriate
Bankruptcy Court, provided that the reaffirmation agreement is received by Sears
not less than five (5) business days prior to the date that the debtor's order of
discharge is entered.
15. In the event a reaffirmation agreement was not filed before discharge in
accordance with Paragraph 14, failing to return the original reaffirmation
agreement, or, if the original was filed with the bankruptcy court, a court time

stamped copy thereof, to the Sears customer or, if represented by counsel, to his or
her attorney, with a cover letter stating that the reaffirmation agreement is void and
of no effect.
16.

Failing to mail, as provided herein, a bankruptcy court time stamped copy

of the reaffirmation agreement and a notice, which may be in the form of a cover
letter, printed in at least 12-point type, which shall contain the following disclosures,
which shall be grouped together and set forth in a clear and conspicuous manner:
(A)

that the Sears customer's agreement to reaffirm a debt to Sears in an

amount which Sears shall disclose in the notice has been filed with the bankruptcy
court and that the Sears customer will owe this amount to Sears after the
bankruptcy case is over unless the Sears customer cancels the reaffirmation
agreement;
(B) that the Sears customer was not required to reaffirm his or her debt and
has the legal right to cancel the reaffirmation agreement;
(C) that the Sears customer may cancel the reaffirmation agreement by (i) a
specified date which Sears shall disclose in the notice that is the date 60 days after
filing of the reaffirmation agreement or (ii) the date the bankruptcy court enters an
order of discharge, whichever happens later;
(D)

that the Sears customer may cancel his or her reaffirmation agreement

by sending a written cancellation to Sears at the address shown on the cover letter;
(E) that no specific form is required to cancel the reaffirmation.

Sears shall mail the bankruptcy court time stamped reaffirmation agreement
and the notice required by this paragraph by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the
Sears customer and, if represented by counsel, the Sears customer's attorney, within
the earlier of (i) five business days of Sears' receiving the time-stamped copy of the
reaffirmation agreement directly from the court or, (ii) if the reaffirmation
agreement is filed by the Sears customer's attorney and obtained by Sears, within
five business days after Sears obtains a bankruptcy court time stamped copy of the
reaffirmation agreement.
17. Representing or implying that nonpayment of any debt will result in, or
threatening to take or taking any action to effect, the seizure, garnishment,
attachment, retaking, or sale of any property or wages of any person, unless Sears
intends to take that action and the action is not prohibited by law.
18. Using a security interest for the purpose of intimidation. For the purpose
of this paragraph, "intimidation" does not include (i) a statement by Sears that it
intends to take action to replevy property if Sears intends to take that action and the
action is not prohibited by law, (ii) the filing of secured claims in bankruptcy
proceedings, or (iii) setting forth in written communications to debtors or attorneys
for debtors that Sears claims a security interest in identified goods and requests a
statement of intention pursuant to Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code.
19. Reporting any adverse information to credit reporting agencies, or failing
to request credit reporting agencies to remove any adverse information previously
reported to a credit reporting agency, concerning (A) any relief granted under this

judgment including restitution and the negation of agreements to reaffirm debt
obtained contrary to law and (B) the failure of a Sears customer to perform under
any agreement to reaffirm debt obtained contrary to law.
20. Ending a credit relationship with a customer based in whole or in part on
Sears relinquishment of its claims to reaffirmed debt, the restitution paid to the •
customer, or other actions related to the customer that Sears is obliged to take under
this judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
21. (A)

For a period of five (5) years from the date of issuance, Sears,

Roebuck and Co., including its subsidiary Western Auto, shall provide a copy of the
injunctive provisions of this judgment to all current and future officers, employees
and bankruptcy court representatives having debt collection responsibilities
(“Covered Persons“), including the recovery of debt from Sears customers who have
filed bankruptcy proceedings and the soliciting and obtaining of reaffirmation
agreements; and shall obtain from the person receiving a copy of the injunctive
provisions a signed and dated acknowledgment indicating the person's name and
the fact that the person has received and read a copy of the injunctive provisions.
Sears shall maintain each original signed acknowledgment for five (5) years. Sears
shall provide the copy of the injunctive provisions and obtain the required signed
acknowledgment within 30 days of the entry of this judgment as to current Covered
Persons and before any new Covered Persons make any contact with a Sears
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customer or the Sears customer's attorney for the purpose of collecting any debt or
enforcing any security interest.
(B) Following the expiration of the requirements of paragraph 21.A., Sears
shall provide written materials reflecting the substantive content of the injunctive
provisions of this judgment to all future Covered Persons not previously subject to
paragraph 21.A. before any such Covered Person makes any contact with a Sears
customer or the Sears customer's attorney for the purpose of collecting any debt or
enforcing any security interest.
22. Subject to any properly asserted attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product claims, Sears shall make available to the Maine Attorney General, at
Sears sole expense, within 30 days of the Attorney General's written request, copies
of all requested documents relating to Sears compliance with this injunction. In the
event Sears needs additional reasonable time to comply with the document request
and cannot agree with the Attorney General on the additional time period, Sears
may apply to the court for additional time.
23. The court shall retain jurisdiction for the purposes of enabling any party to
this judgment to apply to the court at any time for such further orders and
directions as may be necessary or appropriate for (A) the construction or
implementation of this judgment; (B) modifying any of the injunctive provisions of
this judgment if the modification is required to comply with bankruptcy law,
including modifications that may be required by future amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code, (C) modifying any of the injunctive provisions because of
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changed circumstances requiring a modification to enable Sears to conduct business
in a lawful manner; and (D) the enforcement of this judgment and punishment of
violations thereof.
24.

(A)

Because the injunctive relief provided for in this Judgment requires

Sears to substantially alter company-wide policies, the Attorney General agrees not
to initiate any proceeding for contempt pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 for a violation
of the provisions of this Judgment identified in subparagraph (B) for the time
periods therein specified without first contacting Sears counsel, describing the
nature of the alleged violation, and allowing Sears 10 business days to provide a
good faith written"response to such allegations. The written response shall include,
at a minimum, an explanation of how the alleged violation(s) occurred, what action
Sears has taken with regard to the specific consumer or consumers involved, and
details of the corrective steps taken by Sears to prevent future violations.
(B) Subparagraph A) only applies to the following paragraphs of this
Judgment up to the date specified:
(1) September 20, 1997 for alleged violations of paragraph 13.
(C) Nothing herein shall be construed to exonerate any contempt of any
provision of this Judgment after the date of its entry, to compromise the authority of
the Attorney General to initiate a proceeding for any contempt, or to compromise
the authority of the court to punish as a contempt any violation of this Judgment.
Further, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to the limit the authority of
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the Attorney General to protect the interest of the State of Maine or the people of the
State of Maine.
PAYMENTS TO THE STATES
25.

Upon entry of the Consent Judgment entered between the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Sears in Massachusetts Superior Court for
Suffolk County on August 1, 1997, Sears paid 35 Million dollars to the States
Attorneys General, via a check payable to the Massachusetts Attorney General's
Office. The Massachusetts Attorney General shall hold these monies, in an interest
bearing account, for distribution among the States proportionally based upon the
number of Affected Consumers in each State that filed bankruptcy from January 1,
1992 through April 1, 1997, identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A) herein, with a
minimum payment to each State of $50,000, provided, however, that if the
identification of Affected Consumers pursuant to paragraph 2(A) is not complete by
September 2, 1997, the Massachusetts Attorney General may distribute the money to
the States proportionally based upon the number of Affected Consumers in each
State identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A) as of September 2, 1997. Not earlier than
September 2, 1997, the Massachusetts Attorney General shall distribute the relevant
share of monies, including interest accrued, to each State Attorney General to be
used as directed by the settlement entered in such State or as directed by the
respective Attorney General, provided that a Consent Judgment (or similar
document comprising judgment by agreement) has been entered in state court
between such State and Sears concerning Sears' failure to file reaffirmation
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agreements during bankruptcy proceedings. In the event that such a Consent
Judgment between a State and Sears has not been entered in a given State by
September 2, 1997, the Massachusetts Attorney General shall return to Sears, when
distribution is made hereunder, any such State's proportional share (based upon the
number of Affected Consumers in such state identified pursuant to paragraph 2(A))
of the $35 million or $50,000, whichever is greater, together with interest accrued
thereon, provided, however, that i) such time by which a Consent Judgment must
be filed in a given state may be extended by Sears; ii) such time limitation shall not
apply where Sears has failed or refused to execute a Consent Judgment in
substantially the same form as this Consent Judgment; and iii) such time limitation
shall not apply where a State and Sears have filed in state court a Consent Judgment
but such Consent Judgment has not been approved by the Court. In any event,
however, if a State has not presented to Sears, for execution and entry in state court,
a Consent Judgment substantively similar to this Consent Judgment on or before
September 30, 1997, unless such date is extended in writing by Sears, the
Massachusetts Attorney General shall return to Sears any such State's proportional
share of the $35 million, or $50,000, whichever is greater, together with interest
accrued thereon.
26.

Upon entry of the Consent Judgment entered between the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Sears in Massachusetts Superior Court for
Suffolk County on August l, 1997, Sears also paid 5 Million dollars which shall be
held in a new interest bearing account (the “Fund Account"), created by the State

Attorneys General, the monies of which shall be used for consumer education and
consumer protection purposes, including education concerning consumer credit
and consumer rights and responsibilities in the bankruptcy context. These funds
and the interest generated therefrom shall not be commingled with other funds.
Distributions from the Fund Account shall be made at the discretion of a Special
Committee composed of the representatives of three Attorneys General, subject to
the approval of the respective Attorneys General: the Attorney General of
Massachusetts, the Attorney General of California, and the Attorney General of
another State which shall be selected on an annual rotating basis, in the first
instance by the Attorneys General of Massachusetts and California and thereafter by
all three members of the Special Committee. Stich representatives of these three
Attorneys General shall have knowledge and experience in enforcing consumer
protection law as full time civil or criminal prosecutors of consumer law violations.
The Special Committee shall give due consideration to the recommendations, if
any, of the Office of the United States Trustee regarding distributions. For ten years
from the entry of this Judgment, distributions from the Fund Account shall be made
solely from the interest and other returns generated by the Fund Account and no
expenditures shall be made from the principal of the Fund Account. Thereafter, the
Special Committee may authorize expenditures from the principal of the Fund
Account provided that: i) such authorization by the Special Committee is
unanimous; and ii) in no event shall annual expenditures from the principal of the
Fund Account, if authorized, exceed 5 per cent of the annual Fund Account balance.
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The Special Committee may also authorize an annual payment from the Fund
Account to help defray reasonable administrative costs, which annual payment
shall not exceed 1% of the Fund Account balance in any given year. The
administrative fee, if any, shall be verified by the Special Committee as reasonable
and appropriate for administrative costs actually incurred. Not less than once each
year, the Special Committee shall report to the State Attorneys General concerning
the Fund Account and the activities funded thereby. Within 90 days of entry of this
Judgment, the Massachusetts Attorney General shall make application to the
Massachusetts Court for approval by that Court of an Order that sets forth the
procedures to be employed by the Fund Account and the Special Committee and
further defines the purposes, scope, and policies of the Fund Account, its
administration, and its governance.
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS AND VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONS
27.

This Consent Judgment resolves the above-captioned action and the State

will not bring any other action against Sears based upon the facts alleged in the
Complaint. This judgment is entered pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and any failure
to comply herewith may be punishable under that section and/or by civil or '
criminal contempt sanctions.
APPROVED AND SO ORDERED
Date:

z. <
/Justice of the Superior Court
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CONSENT
Peter

J.

B re n n a n

in his capacity as an officer of Sears, Roebuck

and Co. ("Sears"), being so authorized to do so by and on behalf of Sears:
1) admits to the continuing jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the
persons and subject matter of this action,
2) consents to the entry of a Final Judgment regarding the claims at issue
between the State of Maine and Sears, in the form attached hereto,
3) certifies that he has personally read and understands the judgment and
has consulted with counsel, and knowingly and voluntarily enters into this consent
judgment,
4) waives the entry of findings of fact and_conclusions of law pursuant to
Rule 52 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure,
5) understands that any violation of this judgment may result in Sears being
punished pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and/or by being adjudged in contempt of
Court either civilly or criminally.
ASSENTED TO, WAIVING ALL RIGHTS OF APPEAL:

John D. Gleason, Esq.,
Maine Counsel for Sears
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Dated:

JOHN D. GLEASON
Curtis Thaxter Stevens Broder & Micoleau, LLC
0,ne Canal Plaza
PÍO. B o x 7320
Portland, Maine 04112-7320
(207) 775-2361
Maine Counsel for Defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co.

Dated:

4 2,

I *7 *7~7

APPROVED AND SO ORDEREE
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.: CV-

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.

)
)
)

AMENDMENT TO
CONSENT JUDGMENT

)

SEARS, ROEBUCK and CO.,
Defendant.

)

WHEREAS, Plaintiff State of Maine and Defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. having
consented to the entry of this Amendment to Consent Judgment without trial or adjudication of
any issue of fact or law herein and without this Amendment to Consent Judgment constituting
any evidence against or admission by any party with respect to such issue, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Paragraph 25 of the Consent Judgment is amended to add the following sentence at the
end of said paragraph 25: The Attorney General shall apply the monies received pursuant to this
paragraph in his discretion to protect the consumer and civil rights of Maine citizens.

Dated:

STEPHEN L. WESSLER
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207)626-8845
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